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In the consistent development of our previous efforts toward the saving 
and safeguarding of our national life, I have continued to recognize three 
related steps . . . Relief was and continues to be our first consideration.  It 
calls for large expenditures and will continue in modified form to do so 
for a long time to come. . . The second step was recovery, and it is 
sufficient for me to ask each and every one of you to compare the 
situation in agriculture and in industry today with what it was fifteen 
months ago.  At the same time we have recognized the necessity of 
reform and reconstruction. . . . 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1934) 
 
I. Introduction 
During the New Deal the federal government distributed unprecedented amounts of grants and 
loans to state and local governments, leading to the federal government’s share of GNP to rise from about 
4 to 9 percent during the 1930s (Wallis and Oates, 1998, p. 157).  Economic historians and public choice 
scholars have long acknowledged the wide variation in the federal government’s per capita spending and 
lending across the United States and have devoted significant research to understanding the determinants 
of this relatively uneven distribution.
1  Over the past three decades a number of scholars have used 
econometric analysis to test whether New Deal administrators followed Roosevelt’s high-minded public 
goals of “relief, recovery, and reform” or whether they used federal spending and patronage to achieve 
their political goals of maintaining support for Roosevelt and building a lasting Democratic political 
coalition.   4
  To date, research on New Deal spending provides only partial support for the notion that the New 
Deal was designed to promote relief, recovery, and reform.  Regression coefficients on the relief and 
recovery variables – drop in income from 1929 to 1933, unemployment, and the number of relief cases – 
have the expected sign two-thirds of the time, but in half of those cases the null hypothesis of no effect 
cannot be rejected.  Most tests find very little evidence of any reform aspect of the New Deal.  We revisit 
the determinants of New Deal expenditures in this paper by examining the distribution of funds in a 
comprehensive and disaggregated fashion, focusing program-by-program across over 3,000 U.S. 
counties.
2 
  To better understand what motivated New Deal administrators, it is important to focus on the 
individual programs because each was designed to address specific and varied problems.  Politicians 
typically do not publicize their largesse by discussing government spending in general terms; instead, 
they boast of the programs that address specific problems and benefit specific constituencies.  For 
example, when President Roosevelt was asked what his administration was doing for the unemployed, he 
pointed to the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), Civil Works Administration (CWA), 
and the Works Progress Administration (WPA), agencies that put the unemployed back to work and 
provided relief for the destitute.  Roosevelt responded to the depression in farming with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration (AAA), the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), and the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA), and each had its own subsets of programs.  Given this programmatic emphasis, it 
would be inappropriate to expect the major relief programs, for instance, to have been responsive to 
agricultural needs.
3  Focusing our attention on individual programs allows more precision in 
understanding how the New Deal dealt with distinctly different policy problems in relief, agriculture, 
public works, and public loan programs.   Table 1 shows the amount of spending or lending in each of the 
New Deal programs we consider in this paper.   
 Refocusing the analysis of New Deal spending from the state level to the county level is equally 
important.  First, the New Deal programs involved multiple layers of political administration.  The 
ultimate success of each program was determined as much by what happened within states as it was by   5
what happened across states.  Second, there is ample documentation in the New Deal qualitative literature 
that state politicians sometimes viewed the New Deal much differently from the federal government.  
Some actively sought New Deal funds in various programs, while governors in Oklahoma, Virginia, 
North Carolina, and others seemed to disdain the New Deal.
4   Only Wallis (1984, 1987, and 1998), 
Couch and Shughart (1998), Fleck (1999b, 1999c, 2001a), and Strömberg (2001) have tried to control for 
the impact of state and local government decision-making on federal spending explicitly.
5  We are able to 
control for the attitudes of state governments explicitly in our county-level analysis by including state 
dummy variables that account for state attitudes that were common to all counties within each state.   
A third reason the county-level data can be superior to the state data lies in the adage “all politics 
is local.”  Whether the monetary benefits of the New Deal reached their local communities would have 
ultimately determined voters’ assessments of the economic and political effectiveness of the New Deal.  
Had the Roosevelt administration simply sought to use the New Deal for re-election purposes, voters 
would have had to witness the spending locally, not simply at the federal or state levels.
6  County-level 
data, therefore, affords more precise testing of the determinants of New Deal spending.  
 
II.  Measures of the Three Rs in Prior Research 
Historians hold a variety of opinions of the nature of the New Deal.  Schlesinger (1958), Degler 
(1959), and Freidel (1973) argue that the New Deal moved as far as possible toward social reforms given 
the climate of the Great Depression.  In the 1960s a revisionist view developed as Leuchtenburg (1963), 
Zinn (1966), Conkin (1967), and Bernstein (1968) argued that the New Deal was basically conservative.
7  
There was certainly plenty of controversy during the 1930s:  New Deal critics charged the Roosevelt 
administration with using the distribution of funds to enhance its own political power.  These charges 
received substantial press in late 1938 as  newspaper columnists ridiculed WPA administrator Harry 
Hopkins for allegedly declaring to friends that “we shall tax and tax and spend and spend and elect and 
elect” (McJimsey, 1987, p. 124).  Yet the general impressions of the detailed,  non-econometric studies of 
Key (1937), Brown (1940), Howard (1943),  E. A. Williams (1968), J. K. Williams (1968), and Patterson   6
(1969) were that political opportunism was not a primary motivating factor in the distribution of New 
Deal funds. 
Economic historians began examining the distribution of funds with a statistical approach when 
Arrington (1969) noted the substantial disparities in New Deal funding across states.  Reading (1973), 
attempting to empirically test the importance of the relief, recovery, and reform motives, treated relief and 
recovery as a combined category and his proxies for reform might better be described as measuring 
income redistribution.  His econometric results suggested that aggregate New Deal grant funds were 
distributed to promote relief and recovery, but not reform (see Table 2).  Wright (1974) developed a 
political-economic model of the Electoral College and then tested the importance of presidential politics 
in an econometric horse race by adding a series of factors to measure how the New Deal funds might have 
been used to enhance Roosevelt’s re-election prospects.   He found that politics dominated New Deal 
spending decisions and the three Rs had a statistically negligible role 
Table 2 shows how relief, recovery, and reform (or income redistribution) measures perform in 
the large number of econometric studies of the distribution of New Deal funds.  The many blank cells in 
the table suggest that scholars have used a variety of specifications.  Had the New Deal been reform-
minded and redistributive, we would expect negative relationships between New Deal spending and 
income per capita, manufacturing wages, median education, and farm values.  We would expect positive 
relationships between New Deal spending and the percentage of tenants among farmers and percent 
black.  Had the New Deal focused on relief and recovery, we  would expect a negative relationship 
between New Deal spending and the growth in income from 1929 to 1933 and positive relationships 
between unemployment rates and relief cases per capita. 
Most of the studies summarized in the top part of the table have focused on a 48-state cross-
section of aggregate New Deal spending on non-repayable grants from 1933 to 1939, although Wallis 
(1984, 1987, and 1998) and Couch and Shughart (1998) have used a panel of annual data.  The bottom 
section of the table shows the results of a series of studies on specific programs, most using state-level 
data.  Only Fleck (1999b, 2001a) and Stromberg (2001) have used a national county-level data set,   7
although missing data for some of the control variables in each of those studies cause the loss of at least 
400 (probably rural) counties.  Fleck (1999c) also looked at the distribution of FERA spending in 
southern counties and Couch and Williams (1998) and Couch, Atkinson, and Wells (1998) have looked at 
the distribution of New Deal funds and agricultural funds across counties within Alabama.   
Of all the potential tests for reform listed in the table, only three are unequivocally consistent with 
the hypothesis that the New Deal had a reform component.  Fleck (2001b) found that aggregate New Deal 
spending might have been negatively related to income per capita and Fleck (1999b, 2001a) found that 
relatively more relief jobs in 1937 and 1940 were distributed in lower wage areas.  Of 21 tests of the 
hypothesis that the New Deal was designed to offset the severe income drop from 1929 to 1933, 19 found 
coefficients consistent with this idea, but in only half of those cases was the hypothesis of no effect 
rejected.  Of 31 tests of the hypothesis that the New Deal was used to offset unemployment problems, 24 
have the appropriate sign, but only 18 reject the hypothesis of no effect and in two cases the coefficient of 
the lagged effect is the wrong sign.  Our sense of these results, taken as a whole, is that the record of the 
New Deal with respect to relief and recovery is mixed and that it had very little to do with reform. Table 2 
shows how the econometric literature on the determinants of New Deal spending has evolved, as most 
papers have contributed by adding new variables to the analysis.  Yet a closer look at the table shows that 
nearly all of the papers suffer from the omission of at least one key variable category.  Wright (1974) 
added presidential politics to Reading’s (1973) analysis.  Once Anderson and Tollison (1991) mentioned 
the importance of Congress, nearly all scholars writing later have included some measure of 
congressional activity.  Only Wallis (1984, 1987, and 1998), Couch and Shughart (1998; but only for the 
WPA), Fleck (1999b, 1999c, and 2001a), and Stromberg (2001) have sought to control for the important 
role that state governments played in determining the distribution of New Deal funds.  Our primary goals 
in this paper are to extend the econometric New Deal literature in two directions:  to move the level of 
analysis from the state level to the county level and to examine the major New Deal programs 
individually.  
   8
III.  An Intuitive Model of New Deal Spending 
  Consider a simplified portrayal of the problem faced by the federal administrators of a generic 
New Deal program, like a relief program.  Congress, in consultation with the president, established a 
budget to provide grants to state and local governments to help them provide relief.  The law contained 
very loose guidelines about how the monies were to be distributed.  Roosevelt maintained in speeches that 
the administration’s goal was to provide relief where it was needed.  Spending money where people were 
most needy enhanced the president’s re-election chances because constituents reward political 
responsiveness.  On the other hand, political power can be fleeting; at the margin, the administrator 
confronted pressure to shift spending to swing states or to reward voters who defected from the 
Republicans in 1932.  The administrator also faced pressures from congressmen who wanted their own 
constituents to benefit from federal largesse.  Congressional influence had to be considered because 
Congress provided the funding for the program, wrote the funding formulas, and had broad oversight 
power over the New Deal administrator’s activities.  Special attention had to be paid to the demands of 
the members of key committees that directly determined the fate of the program.  Further complicating 
our hypothetical administrator’s job,  many New Deal programs involved significant interaction with state 
and local politicians who faced their own set of political objectives and constraints.  State and local 
governments were directly involved in the New Deal allocation process as they sometimes had to provide 
matching funds for grants.  Moreover, they proposed projects for federal funding and ultimately selected 
those individuals who would receive the relief locally.  Thus, an aggressive state and local government 
would have been able to extract more New Deal funding, all else equal. 
The scenario above focuses on the administration of a single program.  Developing a theoretical 
model that incorporates all of these various pressures across multiple programs with contradictory goals is 
daunting.
8   We simplify the problem by  considering the president, as head of the executive branch, as the 
maximizing agent, making choices over the entire range of programs, subject to constraints imposed by 
Congress, state and local governments, voters, and interest groups.  The president’s multivariate 
maximization problem was, in fact, a series of choices over each individual program. The exogenous   9
variables in the president’s decision-making included all of the factors over which he and the executive 
branch had no direct control, including the state of the economy, the pressures exerted by various interest 
groups, the limits imposed by congressional rules and oversight, and the attitudes of state governments.   
Since the president and his staff paid attention to all of the factors in administering the different programs, 
all of the exogenous factors should be included in the analysis of each of the individual programs.  At the 
margin, each program was a substitute for another since a dollar more for unemployment relief, for 
example, meant a dollar less for agriculture.  As a result, every exogenous variable belongs in the reduced 
form specification of each program.
9  
 
IV.  The Estimation Equations 
  Previous scholars have typically estimated reduced-form equations with per capita New Deal 
spending (aggregated across programs) regressed on variables designed to capture the relief, recovery, 
and reform motives, presidential reelection strategies, congressional clout, and other variables that 
describe the economic structure of the geographic areas.  Following this literature we start with the 














j j ijk k 0 ij 0 ij b X Pop ND ε β β β α       ( 1 ) ,  
where NDij is total New Deal spending in county i from 1933 through 1939 (to keep the notation simpler, 
we suppress an index for programs).  Popij is the population in 1930 in county i, state j, Xijk represents k 
different exogenous explanatory variables Xk indexed by county i and state j, and bj represent state 
dummy variables.  The term εij is a stochastic error with mean zero and variance σ
2. 
Wallis (1998) suggested that the federal government structured total New Deal spending such that 
each geographic area received a base amount of spending, plus a base amount of spending per person, 
plus additional spending per person based on economic, political, reform, recovery, or relief motives.
10   
He argued that political decision-makers would have found it politically unpalatable to spend nothing in a 
state or county, so he structured his model so that each geographic unit was assumed to have received   10
some base amount (α0 in equation (1) above).  Our equation assumes that the remainder of New Deal 
spending was distributed on a per capita basis.  Each county is assumed to have received a base amount, 
β0, per person, in addition to per capita amounts, βk, based on the exogenous characteristics of the county.  
We also allow for differences in spending per person across each state. 
  The equation we estimate is determined by dividing equation (1) by population, creating per 
capita New Deal spending equation similar to the ones previously estimated in the literature: 
∑∑
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where PCNDij is per capita New Deal spending in county i, state j.  The α0 coefficient shows the baseline 
total spending on the program in all counties in the United States.  The β0 coefficient is the baseline 
spending associated with each person across all counties.  Finally, the βj coefficients represent the 
amounts of per capita spending unique to state j, relative to Connecticut (the excluded state).  Since the 
specification is in per capita terms, heteroskedasticity should not be an issue. 
Table 3 lists the explanatory variables and their summary statistics.  The variables follow those 
used in the existing literature, with some additional variables designed to capture issues that have not 
been fully addressed. The variables are sorted according to the hypotheses being tested and we provide a 
sketch of how to interpret the signs of the coefficients. 
  One of the central features of many of the New Deal spending and loan programs was that state 
and local governments had a significant impact on the extent of federal New Deal spending locally.  Some 
programs, such as the WPA, the non-federal portions of the PWA, FERA, and the Social Security 
Administration, had distinct matching features, although it is not clear how tightly federal administrators 
adhered to these requirements.
11  Even if matching was not an explicit feature of a program, many of the 
spending programs were determined by the types of projects proposed and the applications filed by state 
and local governments.  Thus, their willingness to expend the time and resources necessary to make the 
application, as well as to make sure that the application was of high quality, was an important determinant 
of whether or not the federal government expended funds.  There is ample documentation that different   11
states had vastly different attitudes toward the New Deal (Patterson 1967, Braemen, Bremner and Brody 
1975, Abrams 1992, Collins 1992).  To capture the different states’ attitudes toward the New Deal, which 
were common to all counties within the state, we include a series of state dummy variables.  These state 
dummy variables also control for other factors, particularly the nature of Senate representation.  Wallis 
(1987 and 1998) points out that omission of such controls for the difference in state attitudes can lead to 
omitted variables problems that can cause the coefficients to be biased. 
The variables measuring the support for Democratic presidential candidates and voter turnout in 
presidential elections help to control for differences in attitudes toward the New Deal at the county level.  
Roosevelt supporters might have been more willing to press for New Deal involvement locally.  Finally, 
general political savvy and political activity can be measured by the percentage of adults casting 
presidential votes in 1932.  This variable captures voting by both parties, so it might better be treated as a 
measure of political activism and interest in the political process generally.  This in turn could lead to 
greater pressure for New Deal funds. 
  There is one final econometric point worth noting.  We have sought to avoid problems of 
simultaneity bias by using economic variables from 1929 and 1930, before the New Deal was established.  
The one variable where there could be a small problem with endogeneity is our measure of the growth 
rate in real per capita retail sales between 1929 and 1933.  The 1933 value might be affected to some 
degree by some of the New Deal spending that occurred in the second half of 1933.  However, since the 




V. Regression  Results 
  Based on the coefficients from the regression equations, we have calculated elasticities for each 
New Deal program with respect to each variable.  Appendix Tables 1 through 5 report all of the 
regression coefficients and t-statistics.  The elasticities represent the percentage change in per capita funds 
associated with a one-percent increase in the respective variable’s sample mean, holding all others   12
constant.  Asterisks denote the elasticities where the coefficient in the original regression was found to be 
statistically significantly different from zero in a two-tailed t-test at the 10 percent level.  The elasticities 
for the relief, recovery, and reform variables are reported in Table 5, for the presidential variables in 
Table 6, and for the structural economic variables in Table 7. 
V.1  Relief and Recovery 
  Economists analyzing the distribution of New Deal funds originally sought to test whether the 
Roosevelt administration’s actions followed the relief, recovery, and reform mantra.
13  In this sub-section 
we focus on the relief and recovery hypothesis.  Had the New Deal sought to promote relief and recovery 
of the depressed economy, we would expect more spending where unemployment in 1930 was higher and 
where the percentage of farm acreage with crop failures in 1929 was greater.  We expect a negative 
relationship between the change in economic activity from 1929 to 1933 (as measured here by retail sales 
per capita) and New Deal spending. 
  The centerpieces of the Roosevelt administration’s efforts to promote relief and recovery were the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) from 1933 through 1935, the Civil Works 
Administration (CWA) in the winter of 1933-34, the Works Progress Administration (WPA) from 1935 
through 1939, and the public assistance programs developed under the Social Security Act of 1935 
(SSAPA).
14  These programs distributed 62.7 percent of the non-repayable New Deal grants (see Table 1).  
The regression results indicate that each of the relief programs responded to economic hardships.  Each 
program shows a positive and statistically significant relationship between the allocation of funds and the 
unemployment rate in 1930.  The elasticities are 0.252 for the WPA, 0.105 for the FERA, 0.078 for the 
SSAPA programs, and 0.047 for the CWA.  Similarly, for each program there is a negative relationship 
with the difference in log retail sales per capita from 1929 to 1933.  The FERA elasticity is largest in 
magnitude at -0.238, followed by -0.068 for the CWA, while the negative effects are much smaller in size 
and not statistically significant for the WPA and SSAPA programs.  Our findings generally reconfirm 
those of other studies summarized in Table 2 that suggest that the relief and recovery motives were 
important determinants of the allocation of New Deal spending.     13
  An alternative avenue for the federal government to provide work for the unemployed and to 
stimulate a depressed economy were the public works programs,  including the Public Works 
Administration (PWA) established in 1933, the Public Roads Administration (PRA) which built on prior 
federal highway programs, and the Public Buildings Administration (PBA).  The PWA was originally 
established as part of the program to provide relief for the unemployed, but its chief administrator Harold 
Ickes focused on large-scale public works projects designed to have a lasting impact on the economy.  
This emphasis led to relatively long delays in the start of construction and, thus, in the hiring of the 
unemployed.  In contrast, Harry Hopkins, the administrator of the FERA, CWA, and WPA, focused his 
attention on putting the unemployed back to work as quickly as possible.  In the famous “Battle for 
Relief,” Hopkins won the lion’s share of the funding for his projects and the PWA’s focus shifted away 
from unemployment relief toward the building of lasting infrastructure (Schlesinger, 1958, pp. 283-96).  It 
is not clear that Ickes sought to promote recovery in the regions where the economy declined most.  He 
saw the PWA as stimulating the overall economy and not specific regional economies.  In congressional 
hearings Ickes was asked whether the PWA focused on variations in unemployment when distributing 
projects to various areas.  Ickes replied:  “In a general way, we have that in the back of our heads.  But if 
the purpose of this program is to give employment, to relieve unemployment, and to stimulate heavy 
industries, it does not matter a great deal whether you are building in California or New York” (quoted in 
J. K. Williams, 1968, p. 116 n.22).
15 
Total PWA activity combined two programs.  Federal PWA programs were sponsored by federal 
agencies with strong central control over those programs.  Non-federal PWA grants and loans were made 
to state and local governments.  The impetus for these programs came from state and local governments. 
  Despite the professed limited attention paid to the unemployed, the PWA federal program appears 
to have been highly responsive to the unemployment rate in 1930.  The unemployment elasticity for the 
federal PWA was the highest of any program studied at 0.693.  The effect for PWA spending as a whole, 
however, was muted because the non-federal PWA grants were negatively related to the unemployment 
ratio in 1930 with an elasticity of -0.122.  The regression results are also consistent with Ickes’s relative   14
indifference to recovery efforts in the hardest hit areas.  The elasticity for the federal PWA program with 
respect to changes in log retail sales of 0.99 suggests that the federal program spent more funds in the 
areas that experienced the least damaging declines from 1929 to 1933.  In sum, the PWA agency was a 
study in contrasts with respect to promoting relief and recovery. 
  The agencies least interested in relief and recovery were the PRA and PBA.  The PRA was 
statutorily locked into a formula based on population and land size and Fleck (2001b) found that on a per 
capita basis state-level PRA spending was very highly correlated with land area (0.994).  Our county-
level analysis suggests that the PRA and the PBA largely ignored recovery and relief and may have even 
exacerbated cross-county economic differences.  Both programs had a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with the unemployment ratio and a positive relationship with the growth in retail 
sales.  In other words, the better an economy fared during the Depression, the more money it received for 
federal roads and buildings. 
  Farm programs were designed to promote higher incomes for farmers.  We have data on the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration’s (AAA) payments to farmers to take acreage out of production, 
the Farm Credit Administration’s (FCA) loans to farmers through the Land Bank Commissioner for crop 
loans and for debt relief, the Farm Security Administration’s (FSA) mixture of loans and grants to 
financially troubled farmers, and the Rural Electrification Administration’s (REA) loans to bring 
electricity to farms.  Many of the farm programs display a negative and statistically significant 
relationship to the unemployment rate, although measured unemployment may have been more of an 
urban phenomenon during the period.  All farm programs except the REA distributed funds to areas 
where the downturns were steepest as measured by the growth rate of retail sales from 1929 to 1933.  The 
strongest negative elasticities of -0.392 and -0.223 were found for the FSA’s grant and loan programs, 
respectively.  This is not surprising; the FSA was specifically charged with aiding farmers in financial 
distress.   The basic FSA programs were started under the relief-oriented FERA and the focus on relief 
apparently continued after the FSA was established.  The FSA programs also distributed more funds 
where there was a higher rate of farm failures in 1929, although the elasticities are relatively low.  The   15
AAA payments and the FCA payments were also negatively related to the downturn from 1929 to 1933, 
but had small negative correlations with the rate of farm failures in 1929.   
  The final group of programs provided loans or insured mortgage loans.  The largest of these was 
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), which started under the Hoover administration, and 
loaned money to banks, industry, local governments, and provided funding for a variety of New Deal 
programs.  The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) provided direct lending to homeowners who 
were already at risk of defaulting on their own mortgages.  The HOLC loaned money at more favorable 
terms for these at-risk borrowers.  Finally, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured private 
lenders against the default risk associated with making home improvement and mortgage loans. 
  The only loan and insurance program that appears related to relief and recovery is the HOLC, 
which had an elasticity of -0.059 for the growth rate of retail sales.  The coefficients in the RFC analysis 
might well be biased in a positive direction with respect to the retail sales variable because increased RFC 
lending in 1932 might have softened the downturn in many areas.  In general, the loan programs were 
ones where the borrowers sought funding from the federal government and the rules of the lending 
program required that the agencies pay attention to the ability of their borrowers to repay the loans.  
Roosevelt and other administrators viewed repayment pragmatically.  They worried about a series of loan 
defaults in the early stages of the New Deal that would have led to a public outcry, thus inhibiting their 
future ability to continue the programs or add new programs.  The results from the analysis suggest that 
the emphasis on likely repayment of the loans largely offset any desire to loan more in counties with 
higher unemployment or where the economic downturn was deeper.  The HOLC was focused on 
providing assistance to troubled mortgagees, but even it was careful to lend in cases where the chances of 
repayment were relatively higher.  Had there been no focus on repayment, the elasticity with respect to 
the growth rate in retail sales would have been even more negative.   
 
 
   16
V.2  Reform and Redistribution 
The New Deal push for reform had a variety of meanings, including the introduction of federal 
social insurance, changes in the organization of labor markets, and many legislative mandates that were 
national in scope and likely unrelated to the geographic distribution of New Deal funds.  Following 
previous scholars we have included several variables in the analysis to assess the extent to which the New 
Deal was redistributive.  If reform and redistribution were important factors in the allocation of New Deal 
funds, we would expect a negative relationship between New Deal spending and measures of a county’s 
income level, which we proxy using retail sales per capita in 1929.  County-level personal income data do 
not exist, but retail sales per capita is a reasonable alternative because the state-level correlation between 
the two variables (income and retail sales) was 0.86 in 1929.  We expect a positive relationship between 
New Deal spending and the black percentage of the population and the percent illiterate in 1930, as both 
groups tend to be in the lower tier of the income distribution, holding constant the mean level of income.  
Had the farm programs been redistributive, we expect a negative relationship between average farm size 
and spending on the farm programs.  Finally, we include a measure of the upper tail of the income 
distribution – the ratio of tax returns in 1929 to population in 1930 – within each county.  Income tax 
rates were common to the entire U.S. and less than 7 percent of households earned enough income to pay 
income taxes.
16  If the New Deal were redistributive, the tax return ratio should be inversely related to 
New Deal spending. 
  The studies that focus on aggregate New Deal spending have found almost no evidence that the 
New Deal was redistributive.  This result may be a phenomenon of the aggregation across programs or 
across counties within states.  By contrast, our analysis of the individual relief programs shows strong 
signs of a redistributive bent.  Three of the four major relief programs have a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with per capita retail sales, with elasticities ranging from -0.135 for the FERA to -
0.205 for the WPA.  The CWA has a small negative elasticity that is statistically insignificant.  All four 
also display negative relationships with the tax return ratio, although the elasticities are statistically 
significant for only the WPA and the Social Security programs.  If we expand the discussion of relief to   17
include the Farm Security Administration’s relief programs, we find the anticipated strong negative 
elasticities for both retail sales in 1929 and tax returns.  After combining the results of the relief and 
recovery variables with the reform variables, it appears that the programs specifically designed to provide 
relief actually promoted Roosevelt’s three-R objectives.  Again, it is difficult to say whether these 
objectives were fully realized, but the effects we find in the county-level data are much stronger than 
those seen in analyses using aggregated state data. 
  This positive record of income redistribution under the relief programs only partially extended to 
the black population.  Despite federal officials’ statements that the programs were nondiscriminatory, 
many of the programmatic decisions were made by state and local officials and there are claims that many 
of the decisions were discriminatory (Lieberman, 1998; Sterner, et. al., 1943).  The CWA and the public 
assistance programs were positively and statistically significantly related to the percent black variable, but 
the elasticities were 0.021 and 0.060, respectively.  Meanwhile, the WPA showed a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with a small elasticity of -0.055.  Finally, none of the relief programs 
spent more in areas with higher illiteracy.   
   In the aggregate New Deal statistics, the redistributive aspects of the relief programs are 
overshadowed by other New Deal programs.  For example, the AAA payments to restrict production and 
Farm Credit Administration loans favored large farmers and high-income areas.
17  Both sets of programs 
had positive and statistically significant relationships with the tax return and per capita retail sales 
variables, with elasticities in the range of .036 to .194.  The strongest relationships, however, are with the 
average farm size variable with high elasticities of 1.20 and 0.659 for the AAA and the FCA, 
respectively.
18  These findings are consistent with research that has found that the farm programs favored 
larger farmers often at the expense of non-landowning tenants and wage workers.
19 
  Similarly, the New Deal loan programs favored high-income counties.  If repayment were a 
concern, then the Roosevelt administration would have tended to lend money where income or the 
likelihood of economic progress was relatively greater.  As a result, we see strong positive relationships 
between each of the loan programs and the retail sales variable.  The elasticities range from a low of   18
0.238 for the HOLC mortgage lending to a high of 1.69 in the non-federal PWA loans.  The FHA 
insurance program also displayed a positive and statistically significant elasticity of 0.28.  Not only did 
these loan programs distribute more resources to counties with relatively higher average incomes, but also 
to those counties where there was a larger group in the upper portion of the income distribution.  The 
FHA and nearly all of the loan programs had strong positive relationships with the tax return ratio, with 
elasticities ranging from 0.172 for the RFC to 0.864 for the U.S. Housing Authority.  Public housing 
grants under the PWA (later taken over by the USHA) had very strong positive relationships with the high 
income measures. 
  The PWA and other public works programs had a mixed record with regard to income 
redistribution.  Both the federal and non-federal grants programs for the PWA have positive relationships 
with 1929 retail sales, suggesting that they were not redistributive with respect to average income.  On the 
other hand, they have negative relationships with the tax returns ratio, which suggests that they were 
distributing away from the highest end of the income distribution.  There is also evidence that the federal 
PWA program tried to help areas with larger black populations, possibly to counteract the lack of non-
federal PWA activity in black areas.  The elasticity for percent black was 0.44 for the federal PWA grant 
program and -0.503 for the non-federal PWA lending program.   
  Disaggregating spending by program uncovers the relief, recovery, and reform efforts of the New 
Deal hidden from many previous scholars because of the aggregate nature of their spending data.  Relief 
programs were aimed at lower income areas with higher unemployment and a relatively larger economic 
downturn in the early 1930s.  The farm programs promoted recovery, but were centered on high-income 
counties with larger farms.  Meanwhile, the loan programs, concerned about the likelihood of repayment, 
distributed more funds to high-income counties and those not hit as hard by the Depression. 
 
V.3  Political and Structural Economic Variables 
Although we have focused on the high-minded goals of the New Deal, there are several key 
findings concerning the structural economic variables that deserve attention.
20  The coefficients of the   19
economic variables are largely consistent with the findings of other economists and the historical 
literature on New Deal spending.  The relief programs focused on non-farm areas, while the farm 
programs unsurprisingly targeted agricultural areas.  Fleck (2001b) notes that a state’s land mass was an 
important determinant of its New Deal distribution.  When we look program by program, the elasticities 
show that the large effects Fleck found are primarily associated with two programs:   the Public Roads 
Administration grants, which by statute were to be distributed via a formula based on population and land 
mass, and the PWA grants for projects proposed by federal agencies.    
Scholars have suggested a variety of ways to test whether New Deal expenditures were used for 
naked political purposes.  Wright (1974) developed a “political productivity index” at the state level that 
took into account the long-term support for Democratic presidential candidates between 1896 and 1932, 
as well as the volatility of that support.  Anderson and Tollison (1991) and Couch and Shughart (1998)  
used Roosevelt’s share of the 1932 vote, which is a reasonable specification on the grounds that 
Roosevelt was likely to reward his supporters and that Roosevelt was seeking more than just a 51 percent 
victory so that he could establish a mandate.  Fleck (2001a) developed a model of swing voting in several 
layers of government and found swing voters to be important determinants of the distribution of relief 
jobs.   Rhode, Snyder and Strumpf (2001), in their study of military spending during World War II, argue 
that the focus should be on the swing vote in a median voter model, so they use the gap between the 
Democratic and Republican votes.  
 We take a neutral stance on whether the appropriate standard is the median-voter model or the 
“mandate model,” so include a variety of political variables spanning both views.  If Roosevelt sought to 
reward long-time Democratic supporters, we expect more spending in areas where the mean Democratic 
presidential vote share from 1896 through 1928 was relatively higher.
21  Had Roosevelt sought to 
influence swing voters, we expect more per capita spending in counties where the standard deviation of 
the Democratic vote share from 1896 to 1932 was higher.  Roosevelt might have targeted spending in 
counties based on the difference between his vote share in 1932 and the long-term Democratic vote share 
from 1896 to 1928.  This measure would have targeted areas where voters actually did switch to support   20
Roosevelt in the 1932 election, a group likely to switch again.
22   Fleck (1999c) shows that a key 
determinant of FERA spending was voter turnout, which we measure as the number of presidential votes 
cast in 1932 divided by the population in 1930.  This variable measures the extent to which the populace 
was politically active, which, in turn, would suggest their greater likelihood of successfully lobbying for 
New Deal support. 
From the expansive set of New Deal regressions, two general statements describe the impact of 
presidential politics.  First, in nearly every program at least one political variable affected the distribution 
of funds in the expected direction.  Second, no single presidential political variable exerts a strong 
influence in every program or, for that matter, in a majority of programs.  There is certainly potential for 
multicollinearity in these measures, but closer examination shows that each variable is measuring a 
different aspect of presidential politics.  Since we are sensitive to the potential for omitted variables bias, 
we chose to include them all, such that the regressions provide a simultaneous test of all the potential 
effects. 
The programs most responsive to long-term Democratic support (as measured by mean voting 
from 1896 to 1928) were the AAA, the REA, and most of the public works programs.  In the case of the 
public works programs, the PWA programs, and the PBA all have elasticities ranging from 0.22 to 1.28, 
but only the PBA coefficient is statistically significant.   
Long-term Democratic supporters were less likely to determine elections than swing voters, 
however.  The swing voters most likely to stay with Roosevelt in 1936 were the ones who swung to 
Roosevelt in the 1932 election (as measured by the vote for Roosevelt in 1932 minus the mean 
Democratic vote, 1896-1928).  The programs that were most responsive to the Roosevelt swing were the 
FERA, the WPA, the PRA, the FSA grants, and the REA.  The PRA’s 0.188 elasticity with respect to the 
Roosevelt swing vote, as well as the 0.654 elasticity with respect to voter turnout, suggest that there was 
room within the road-allocation formula to accommodate presidential reelection goals. 
Holding constant the Roosevelt swing vote, the standard deviation of votes from 1896 to 1932 
measures deeper-seated volatility among a county’s voters.  The programs most responsive to this   21
measure include the PWA federal and non-federal programs, the FCA loan programs, the FSA grant 
programs, and the U.S. Housing Administration programs.  All have elasticities higher than 0.14 and the 
PWA federal program elasticity is extremely large at 2.53. 
The political measure that seems to have an impact on the most programs is the measure of voter 
turnout.  The variable not only reflects interest in presidential politics, but also interest in the political 
process more generally.  Such localized political interest and savvy might have been associated with 
greater pressure by the state and local governments on the federal government to obtain more funding.   
Given the way nearly all of the programs were structured  – state and local governments applied for grants 
and loans – we would expect state and local governments to have played an important role in the overall 
allocation of New Deal funds.  The programs with elasticities above 0.10 included the CWA, SSA public 
assistance programs, the public works programs at both the federal and non-federal levels, the PRA, the 
FCA loans, the RFC, the FSA loans, the REA loans, and the FHA.   Most of the coefficients on which the 
elasticities are based are also statistically significant.    
The public works programs deserve slightly more discussion on this political dimension.  The 
PWA developed a reputation for focusing on the long-term value of projects, avoiding scandal, and 
making decisions without regard to politics.  In Senate hearings before the Committee on Appropriations 
concerning the 1935 allocations for the PWA, Senators Townsend and Chairman Glass, an avowed 
opponent of federal subsidies, each declared that they thought Ickes was free of politics when distributing 
PWA funds (J. K. Williams, 1968, p. 128).  Yet, biographers note that Ickes served Roosevelt faithfully in 
stump speeches leading up to the 1936 election (Clarke, 1996).  The results of the analysis suggest that 
the federal PWA program, a program over which the Roosevelt administration exercised direct control, 
was highly sensitive to political interests.  The elasticities on each of the political variables are among the 
highest that we calculated, although not all are precisely estimated.  Part of the PWA’s reputation for 
being above politics might have come from looking at the combined spending on the federal and 
state/local programs.  Given that the state and local PWA project selections were driven more from the 
bottom up, their impact would have muted the effects of the federal programs.  In fact, the elasticity for   22




Did the New Deal indeed promote relief, recovery, and reform?  The answer largely depends on 
the program.  The major relief programs appear to have been responsive to the ideals of the three Rs.    
Measures of unemployment, the depth of the depression, and proxies for income consistently affected 
allocations for relief.  Relief programs were not used exclusively for high-minded objectives, political 
factors were important, but politics seems to have mattered more in the agricultural and public works 
programs than in the relief programs.  Whether the magnitudes of the elasticities with respect to relief and 
recovery are “enough” to say that the programs were adhering to the three-R mantra is a normative 
question that will always depend on the eye of the beholder.  
 Many other New Deal programs display only limited relationships to the relief, recovery, and 
reform motives.  Every loan and housing program distributed more funds in areas with higher levels of 
per capita retail sales and a higher percentage of households rich enough to pay income taxes.  The farm 
programs typically distributed relatively more money in areas with larger farms and, aside from the FSA, 
distributed more money to areas with higher average incomes and with a higher share of wealthier 
citizens.  The public works programs also tended to be more generous to areas with higher average retail 
sales per person.  Most of these programs were designed from the start to require state, local, or even 
private investment before funding could be assured.  Most of the loans were expected to be repaid, 
farmers had to have enough land to take some out of production before the AAA stepped in, and the non-
federal public works programs required significant local sponsorship.  To join these programs, 
communities had to have sufficient resources to meet the financial requirements of the program, hence, 
the strong relationships between program spending and income. 
  The New Deal was designed to provide something for everyone.  The Roosevelt administration 
targeted specific programs to the needs of particular groups.  The regression results show that relief   23
programs clearly benefited the unemployed in urban areas and the AAA aided larger farmers.  Geographic 
areas with larger middle and upper income classes, many of whom also experienced substantial problems 
during the Depression, received more loans from the RFC and the PWA.   Many people with the 
resources to own homes benefited from HOLC loans and FHA insurance of mortgages.  The county-level 
information highlights the targeted nature of the New Deal’s efforts. 
  There is no doubt that politics was important.  At least one of the presidential political variables 
had an economically and statistically significant impact on nearly every program.  Even the Public Works 
Administration, which was famous for its alleged nonpartisanship, appears to have distributed funds for 
federally sponsored projects with the presidential elections in mind.  Part of the PWA’s reputation derived 
from the funding of non-federal projects, which were often the result of choices made by state and local 
jurisdictions. 
  In the final analysis a large fraction of the New Deal money that was spent followed Roosevelt’s 
three-R mandate, but politics was important too. The New Deal’s high-minded agenda was not only the 
result of a focus on public service but also a response to the demands of the populace in the heart of a 
Great Depression.  Roosevelt, Hopkins, Ickes, and the other administrators of the New Deal were savvy 
politicians who understood the problems their constituents faced.  Winning reelection required more than 
spending extra funds in certain key swing areas, rewarding Democratic supporters, or spending where 
people turned out more for Roosevelt.  To please their nationwide constituency, they had to promote relief 
and recovery at the very least (redistribution is trickier because it often goes to people who are less likely 
to vote).  They established a plethora of programs, each with a specific problem to solve.  Thus, for those 
concerned with unemployment, Roosevelt and Hopkins could point to the FERA, CWA, and WPA.  To 
those concerned with farm problems, they pointed to the AAA and the FCA.  It is important to look at the 
range of programs that were offered for evidence of Roosevelt’s political motivation because within any 
specific program his administrators had only limited political leeway.  Had the largest relief grants gone 
to the areas with the lowest unemployment, for example, there might have been a scandal sufficient to 
stymie their reelection hopes.  It was good politics to deliver on the high-minded goals, just as it was good   24
politics to spend more money at the margin, everything else constant, in areas that were key to the 
reelection effort.   25
DATA APPENDIX 
New Deal spending information is from the U.S. Office of Government Reports (1940).  Table 1 
shows the total amounts from March 1933 through June 1939 distributed by the various programs.  Retail 
sales information from 1933 is from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic 
Commerce (1936).  The 1929 retail sales information is from Historical, Demographic, Economic, and 
Social Data:  The United States, 1790-1970, ICPSR tape number 0003, as corrected by Michael Haines.  
The population figures used to create our per capita estimates for 1929 and 1933 retail spending were 
calculated using linear interpolations of the 1930 and 1940 populations.  We calculated 1929 population 
as 1930 minus the average annual change in population between 1930 and 1940; we did not use trends 
from 1920 to 1930 due to changes in county boundaries between 1920 and 1930.  The percent black, 
percent urban, percent of a county’s land in farms, inverse of population, area in square miles, 
unemployed as a percent of the gainfully employed, average farm size, and percent of acres with crop 
failure are from the 1930 files in ICPSR tape 0003 as corrected by Michael Haines.  For 1930 we used the 
illiteracy rate for people aged 10 and above. The tax return information comes from U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce (1932). 
The mean Democratic share of the presidential vote from 1896-1928, the percent voting for 
Roosevelt in 1932 minus the mean Democratic share from 1896 to 1928, the standard deviation of the 
Democratic share of the presidential vote from 1896 to 1932, and the percent of adults voting in 1932 
were all calculated using information from ICPSR’s United States Historical Election Returns, 1824-1968 
(ICPSR tape number 0001).  The variables measuring House tenure and representation on House 
committees between 1933 and 1938 are from U.S. Congress, Official Congressional Directory, for the 
73
rd Congress 1
st session through 76
th Congress.  We then matched the congressional information with the 
counties.  For the majority of New Deal programs we used average congressional information from the 
1933 to 1938 period.  For shorter-lived programs we used congressional information tied to those periods.  
For example, for the CWA we used the 1933 information, for FERA the 1933-1935 information, for the 
WPA grants, SSAPA grants, and USHA loans we used 1935-1938 information.    
The data set consists of 3,060 counties and county/city combinations in the United States.  The 
New Deal program information was reported for some combined counties.  For example, the New Deal 
information was reported for all of New York City.  Thus, in New York state, Bronx, Kings, New York, 
Queens, and Richmond counties were combined into New York City.  Similar situations developed in 
other states.  In Missouri, St. Louis City and County were combined.  In Virginia we combined the 
following districts that were reported separately in the Census, but together in the New Deal data:  
Albemarle county and Charlottesville city; Allegheny county and Clifton Forge city; Augusta county and 
Staunton city; Campbell county and Lynchburg city; Dinwiddie county and Petersburg city; Elizabeth 
City county and Hampton city; Frederick county and Winchester city; Henrico county and Richmond city; 
Henry county and Martinsville city; James City county and Williamsburg city; Montgomery county and 
Radford city; Nansemond county and Suffolk city; Norfolk county with Norfolk city, South Norfolk city; 
and Portsmouth city; Pittsylvania county and Danville city; Prince George county and Hopewell city; 
Roanoke county and Roanoke city; Rockbridge county and Buena Vista city; Rockingham county and 
Harrisonburg city; Spotsylvania county and Fredericksburg city; Warwick county and Newport News 
city; Washington county and Bristol city; Arlington county and Alexandria city.  A small number of 
counties were dropped from the sample due to missing values for the variables above.   26
FOOTNOTES 
 
1  See Arrington (1969) and the studies summarized in Table 2. 
2 As in the prior literature, we focus on the distribution of funds without examining the tax collection side 
of the analysis.  Federal tax rates were uniform nationwide, so variations in federal tax revenue from the 
counties would have been driven by the number of families with incomes large enough to pay income 
taxes (less than 7 percent nationwide), the extent of corporate activity, and differences in the consumption 
of goods subject to excise taxes.  We are also not trying to capture the indirect effects of payments that 
might arise from changes in markets in response to the grants and loans. 
3 Another issue to consider is that not all federal dollars were alike.  A dollar from the WPA was likely to 
have a bigger economic effect than an AAA dollar.  The AAA dollar was essentially a payment to a 
farmer to take land out of production, thus the net benefit of the AAA dollar to the farmer was less than a 
dollar.  Similarly, in this analysis we take a look at specific loan programs for the first time.  Since the 
majority of loans that were made were to be repaid, it is clear that loan dollars had quite a different 
meaning than grant dollars. 
4 For an appreciation of the variety of strategies followed by state and local governments in response to 
the New Deal, see Patterson (1967), and the case studies on North Carolina by Abrams (1992), on 
Arizona by Collins (1999), on the South by Biles (1994), and the series of studies of Massachusetts, Ohio, 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, New Mexico, Oregon, and 
Missouri edited by Braeman, Bremner, and Brody (1975).  
5 Wallis (1984) used a simultaneous equations model that explicitly examined matching; Wallis (1987 and 
1998) used lagged grants to try to capture the pressures from state governments; and Fleck (1999b and 
1999c) used state dummies in his county-level analysis to control for state government activities.  Couch 
and Shughart (1998) looked at the sponsor’s role in the WPA, but in another analysis they had panel data 
but did not use state effects or lagged grants to control for state interests in the New Deal. 
6 For analyses of the factors influencing work relief, unemployment, and private employment at the 
individual level for WPA workers in 1940, see Margo (1991), Finegan and Margo (1994), and Sundstrom 
(1995). 
7 See Graham (1973) and Sitkoff (1985) for debates about the New Deal. 
8 For innovative approaches to theoretical modeling of the political process in this context, see the work 
of Wright (1974), Fleck (1999a, 1999b, 2001a) and Rhode, Snyder, and Strumpf (2001).   
9 Estimating separate structural equations for each program, but directly taking into account the fact that 
all programs were substitutes, would involve finding instrumental variables for each individual program.  
That would be a most difficult task.  
10 For a discussion of the political nature of this variable, see Fleck (2001b) and Wallis (2001). 
11 The Social Security Administration’s public assistance programs required explicit matching from the 
states.  The FERA was originally designed such that half of the initial monies were to be distributed with 
a strong matching grant component and the other half was to be distributed on a discretionary basis.  
However, after spending $200 million on a matching basis by November 1933, FERA administrator 
Harry Hopkins convinced Congress to allow the FERA to distribute the monies on a discretionary basis, 
which is how the vast majority of FERA funds were spent.  See U.S. Senate (1935, pp. xi-xiv), E. A. 
Williams (1968, pp. 181-90, 203-17), and Couch and Shughart (1998).  The WPA also asked state and 
local governments to contribute funding to its projects, although there was never an explicit matching 
formula and the federal share of the funding of projects varied substantially across states (Howard, 1943, 
pp. 146-50). 
12 Because we are estimating separate equations for multiple programs, we might have needed to pay 
attention to potential cross-equation error correlations by using a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
analysis.  However, since all of the equations we estimate have the same set of independent variables, the 
SUR estimator is the same as the OLS estimator. 
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13 Wright (1974), Wallis (2001), and Fleck (2001b) have followed the procedure of comparing the R-
squareds from regressions with just the political variables to regressions with just the economics and 
structural variables to see which sets of variables explain more of the variation in the sample.  We have 
performed similar comparisons (see Appendix Table 6) in which we compared the adjusted R-squareds 
from regressions with only the presidential and congressional variables listed in Table 3 (percent voting 
democrat for president 1896-1928 through the Congressional committee assignments) to regressions with 
only the structural and reform, relief, and recovery variables (inverse population through average farm 
size).  The adjusted R-squared from the structural and three-R specifications are larger than those from 
the political specifications in all but the SSA public assistance regression.    We did not include the state 
dummy variables in either regression because they control simultaneously for both political and non-
political factors.  In the county studies, F-tests reject the hypothesis that all of the state effects are 
simultaneously zero in nearly all cases.     
14 The WPA lasted through 1942, but our data set only records spending through June 1939 for any 
program.  The Social Security programs include Aid to Dependent Children, Aid to the Blind, and Old-
Age Assistance.   
15 Harold Ickes administered the PWA, with advice from a Special Board.  Generally, the projects were 
vetted by each of three sections of the central office and then sent on to the Special Board.  Roosevelt had 
the final say and E. A. Williams (1968, 106 and 114-16) claimed that Roosevelt did not just “rubber 
stamp” Ickes’s decisions.  In discussing how the PWA funds were distributed, Williams argued that the 
Special Board did not focus on the variables that the National Planning Board deemed important to 
consider, such as population, unemployment, relief spending, tax contributions, or land area, but that the 
Special Board did take note occasionally of its comparative generosity to some states and restricted or 
postponed allotments accordingly. 
16 The tax information has been used by a number of scholars (Smiley 2000, Schmitz and Fishback 1983) 
as proxies for the share of income in the highest tail of the income distribution. 
17 Unlike most New Deal agencies, the AAA was administered by an existing department – the 
Department of Agriculture – which established state and local committees or associations of producers to 
help administer the act.  The AAA Rental and Benefit payments were distributed to farmers who agreed 
to participate in a program of controlled production.  Farmers voluntarily signed production agreements in 
which they would curtail the acreage they planted.  The benefit payments were financed from special 
processing taxes on the commodity being curtailed.  The goal of the program was to increase the incomes 
of farmers both through benefit payments and by raising market prices to pre-World War I levels (1920s 
levels for tobacco).  There was a general belief that most of the burden of the processing taxes would be 
passed on to consumers of farm products.  For detailed discussions of the AAA administration, see 
Nourse, et. al. (1937, pp. 39-40, 92-114, 120-46, 287-323). 
18 The measure of farm size is problematic in southern plantation areas where there were large numbers of 
sharecroppers who were treated by the census as farm operators, when in fact they were more like farm 
laborers.  See Alston and Kaufmann (1997). 
19 See Saloutos (1974 and 1982), Alston (1981), Whatley (1983), and Biles (1994). 
20 A key theme of Anderson and Tollison’s (1991) work was that it was important to include 
Congressional pressures.  We include them in several ways.  For the House of Representatives we include 
measures of the tenure of congressmen representing the district in which the county was located.  House 
members with longer tenures had more seniority on committees at this time.  Weingast and Marshall’s 
(1988) discussion of the organization of Congress suggests that committee members wield significant 
power over the passage of bills and over the administration of administrative programs.  Members of 
committees have more clout than the typical representative in determining how monies will be 
distributed, either through writing the rules for distributing funds in advance of the bill or through 
pressures to spend the money after the program is in place.  To capture this effect, we include 
representation on a series of key committees in the House of Representatives at the opening of the 73
rd 
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Congress in 1933.  The same issues obviously exist for the Senate.  The impact of the Senate influences is 
among several factors that are captured by the state dummy variables. 
  The impact of House tenure was relatively small on the distribution process.   The elasticity was 
higher than 0.05 for only the U.S. Housing Authority loans.  The coefficients of the congressional 
committee variables suggest that for most programs there was one and sometimes more committees that 
appeared to increase spending in the area in a statistically significant way.  Membership on the 
Agriculture Committee was associated with an extra $20 per capita in AAA spending, $6.5 in FCA loans, 
and $1.23 in REA loans.  Appropriations Committee membership was associated with an extra $6.86 in 
non-federal PWA loans.  The Irrigation and Control Committee raised FSA grants by $0.86.  The Labor 
Committee appeared to influence the most programs, raising FERA, CWA, and AAA grants and USHA 
loans.  The Public Lands Committee raised FERA spending, PRA spending and AAA spending.  The 
Roads Committee increased WPA, RFC, and HOLC funds.  Finally, Ways and Means primarily 
influenced the public buildings and public housing grants.   
  We have experimented with using the Poole and Rosenthal (1997) measures of ideological 
location in political space, but the elasticities were all low and the coefficients were typically statistically 
insignificant.  We also experimented with a dummy variable accounting for southern Democratic 
congressmen, but the variable had little impact. 
21 This is similar to a key component of Wright’s presidential political productivity index.  Other key 
components included the number of electoral votes in each state and the standard deviation of the 
democratic voting. 
22Wright’s political productivity index for analysis at the state level was weighted by the votes in the 
Electoral College.  We have experimented with using an electoral votes measure for each county that 
multiplied the state’s electoral votes by the county’s share of the population.  Given the way electoral 
votes were determined, this essentially becomes a measure of population share nationwide.  Inclusion of 
the variable leads to results that yield largely the same inferences as reported here.   29
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Table 1 
 
Total Federal Grants, Loans, and Value of Mortgages Insured, March 1933 – June 1939, by 
Program 
 




  Agricultural Adjustment Adm. (AAA)  $1,981,801,905 12.1 
  Farm Security Adm. (FSA) Grants  93,408,281  0.6 
  U.S. Housing Authority (USHA)  127,206,671  0.8 
  Public Building Adm. (PBA) Federal Buildings  174,228,825  1.1 
  Public Roads Adm. (PRA)  1,556,290,368  9.5 
  Public Works Adm. (PWA) Federal Projects  798,501,411  4.9 
  Public Works Adm. (PWA) Non-Federal Projects  1,367,347,520  8.4 
  Civil Works Adm. (CWA)  757,172,702  4.6 
  Federal Emergency Relief Adm. (FERA)  2,654,860,349  16.3 
  Social Security Adm. Public Assistance (SSAPA)  596,010,054  3.6 
  Works Progress Adm. (WPA)  6,222,385,662  38.1 
Total Grants  16,329,213,748  100.0 
    




  Farm Credit Adm. (FCA) Loans  $1,257,491,136  12.0 
  Farm Security Adm. (FSA) Loans  427,932,675  4.1 
  Rural Electrification Adm. (REA) Loans  226,247,292  2.2 
  Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC)  3,077,258,287  29.5 
  U.S. Housing Authority (USHA) Loans  449,854,991  4.3 
  Disaster Loan Corp. (DLC)  $10,504,466  0.1 
  Reconstruction Finance Corp. (RFC)  4,425,940,596  42.4 
  Public Work Adm. (PWA) Non-Federal Program   
Loans 
567,616,807 5.4 
Total Loans  10,442,846,250  100.0 
  
INSURANCE:    




Note: The RFC loans began in February 1932. 
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Table 3 
 
Summary Statistics and Interpretations of Independent Variables Included in the Regression Analysis of 
Each New Deal Program 
 
 
Variables  Sign and meaning of Coefficients  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Structural Economic:      
Inverse of population, 1930  Positive suggests program provided 
base level of spending 
8.90 14.0 
Area in square miles per capita, 1930  Positive suggests rewarding large 
areas with less population density 
0.10 0.27 
Percent of land in farms, 1929  Positive suggests focused on farm 
areas 
64.5 27.3 
Percent Urban, 1930  Positive suggests focused on urban 
areas 
21.0 24.8 
Reform Motive:      
Tax returns filed per capita, 1929  Negative suggests redistribution  1.41  1.32 
Retail Sales per capita, 1929  Negative suggests redistribution  541.2  269.8 
Percent black, 1930  Positive suggests redistribution  11.1  18.4 
Percent illiterate, 1930  Positive suggests redistribution  5.41  5.83 
Relief and Recovery Motives:      
Difference in log retail sales per capita, 
1933-1929 
Negative suggests promoted relief 
and recovery 
-0.47 0.24 
Unemployed as percent of gainfully 
employed, 1930 
Positive suggests promoted relief and 
recovery 
2.79 2.20 
Percent of farm acres with crop failures, 
1929 
Positive suggests promoted relief and 
recovery 
3.19 4.07 
Average farm size, 1929  Positive suggests larger farms 
benefited disproportionately 
82.3 88.6 
Political Influence:      
Mean Democratic presidential vote 
percentage, 1896-1928 
Positive suggests rewarded long-term 
Democratic voters 
49.4 18.5 
Percent voting for Roosevelt in 1932 
minus above mean from 1896-1928 
Positive suggests rewarded voters 
who swung to Roosevelt in 1932 
18.8 10.3 
Standard deviation of presidential voting 
percentage for Democrats, 1896-1932 
Positive suggests focused on long-
term volatility of swing voters 
11.7 4.90 
Votes cast in 1932 presidential election / 
1930 population 
Positive suggests rewarded voter 
activism 
31.6 15.0 
Average months of consecutive tenure in 
the House during period of program 
Positive suggests House members 
with more seniority brought more 
dollars 
51.9 64.6 
House committee assignments during 
period of program 
Positive suggests congressional clout 
increased funds 
  
Vector of State Dummies  Controls for unmeasured differences across states common 
to the counties within each state, including Senate 
representation 
Note:  There are 3,060 observations. 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1933   
RELIEF                     
  FERA Grants  0.012   0.209 * -0.104 * 0.071   0.011  
  CWA Grants  -0.026   0.064 * -0.074 * 0.375 *  -0.002  
  WPA Grants  0.005   0.165 * -0.234 * -0.050   -0.007  
  SSA Pub. Asst. 
Grants  0.036   0.016   -0.062   0.719 *  0.011  
PUBLIC WORKS                 
 Federal PWA 
Grants  0.708   0.997   2.526 * 8.417 *  0.019  
 Nonfederal PWA 
Grants  0.220   -0.292 *  0.276   0.430   -0.060  
 Nonfederal PWA 
Loans  1.280   -0.302   0.146   0.792   -0.187  
 PRA Grants  0.094   0.188 * -0.170 * 0.654 *  0.003  
 PBA Grants  0.772 *  -0.001   -0.102   0.105   -0.022  
FARM 
PROGRAMS                 
  AAA Grants  0.262 *  0.269 * -0.085   0.096   0.047 * 
  FCA Loans  -0.009   0.046   0.227 * 0.191 *  0.017  
  FSA Grants  0.007   0.361 *  0.283 * -0.449 *  -0.001  
  FSA Loans  0.100   0.013   0.090   0.139   -0.041 * 
  REA Loans  0.922 *  0.453 * -0.149   0.908 *  0.035  
RFC, HOUSING LOANS, AND 
INSURANCE            
  RFC Loans  -0.108   -0.107   0.206   0.216   0.004  
  HOLC Loans  -0.180 *  -0.045   -0.071   -0.327 *  -0.011  
  FHA Loans 
Insured   -0.209   -0.103   0.143   0.299   -0.056 * 
  USHA Loan 
Contracts  0.074   0.128   0.483   -1.408 *  0.009  
 PWA/USHA 
Grants  -0.063   0.737   0.477   -0.738   0.071  
AGGREGATES                 
  Total Grants  0.140 *  0.226 *  0.016   0.580 *  0.009  
    Relief Grants  0.007   0.154 * -0.170 * 0.088   0.000    42
    Public Works 
Grants  0.248   0.242 *  0.420 * 2.045 *  -0.007  
  Total Loans  0.090   -0.001   0.139 * 0.183 *  -0.008  
 
* = coefficient upon which the elasticity is based is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, or 
better, in a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes: The sample size is 3,060 counties.  The elasticities are based on the sample means and coefficients 
from regressions with all of the variables listed in Table 3 included as independent variables.  Each 
elasticity shows the percentage change in expenditures in each program associated with a one percent 
increase in the variable in each column, holding all other variables constant.  The coefficients and t-
statistics are reported in Appendix Tables 1 through 5.  
 
Sources:  See Data Appendix.   43
Table 6 
 


















1929   
RELIEF                   
  FERA Grants  0.023 *  0.008   0.095 * -0.564 * 
  CWA Grants  0.058 *  -0.005   0.072 * -0.449 * 
  WPA Grants  -0.018   -0.020 * 0.109 * -0.594 * 
  SSA Pub. Asst. 
Grants  0.022 *  0.002   0.019   -0.194 * 
PUBLIC WORKS              
 Federal PWA 
Grants  -0.971 *  0.822 * 0.071   -0.272  
 Nonfederal PWA 
Grants  -0.005   -0.010   0.073   -0.010  
 Nonfederal PWA 
Loans  -0.071   0.044   0.076   -0.501  
 PRA Grants  0.335 *  0.252 * -0.030   -0.067  
 PBA Grants  -0.117 *  0.023   -0.006   -0.598 * 
FARM 
PROGRAMS              
  AAA Grants  0.056 *  -0.050 * -0.193 * -0.113 * 
  FCA Loans  0.054 *  0.027 * -0.189 * 0.172 * 
  FSA Grants  0.021   0.000   0.095 * -0.328 * 
  FSA Loans  0.006   0.003   -0.051 * -0.073  
  REA Loans  -0.026   -0.027   -0.274 * 0.431 * 
RFC, HOUSING LOANS, AND 
INSURANCE         
  RFC Loans  0.034   -0.049 * 0.203 * -0.424 * 
  HOLC Loans  -0.006   -0.030 * 0.368 * -0.168 * 
  FHA Loans 
Insured   0.049 *  -0.072 * 0.241 * -0.164  
  USHA Loan 
Contracts  0.082   0.034   1.323 * -1.737 * 
 PWA/USHA 
Grants  0.165   0.082   0.793 * -0.926  
AGGREGATES              
  Total Grants  0.024 *  0.067 * -0.004   -0.278 * 
    Relief Grants  0.003   -0.010   0.094 * -0.538 * 
    Public Works  0.016   0.302 * 0.009   -0.106    44
Grants 
  Total Loans  0.024 *  -0.004   0.020   -0.083  
 
* = coefficient upon which the elasticity is based is statistically significant at the 10 percent level, or 
better, in a two-tailed test. 
 
Notes:  The sample size is 3,060 counties.  The elasticities are based on the sample means and coefficients 
from regressions with all of the variables listed in Table 3 included as independent variables.  Each 
elasticity shows the percentage change in expenditures in each program associated with a one percent 
increase in the variable in each column, holding all other variables constant.  The coefficients and t-
statistics are reported in Appendix Tables 1 through 5.  
  
Sources:  See Data Appendix. 
   45
  
Appendix Table 1 
 




  FERA Grants  CWA Grants  WPA Grants  SSAPA Grants 
  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat. 
Intercept 11.1134  2.27  2.5133  2.08  50.1770 4.10  3.8958 2.82 
Inverse 
Population 0.0421  1.94  0.0392  7.33  -0.0704 -1.30  0.0132 2.16 
Square miles per 
capita 1.2293  0.96  -0.2713  -0.85  -6.9397 -2.15  0.1125 0.31 
% Urban  0.0743  4.80  0.0208  5.45  0.1815 4.69  0.0049 1.13 
% Land on Farms  -0.1433 
-
11.74  -0.0420  -13.92  -0.3224 -10.54  -0.0163 -4.71 
Tax returns per 
capita -0.1019  -0.30  0.0180  0.22  -1.9694 -2.34  -0.6399 -6.75 
Retail Sales per 
capita, 1929  -0.0041  -2.28  -0.0004  -0.86  -0.0133 -2.95  -0.0015 -2.88 
% Black  -0.0208  -0.90  0.0116  2.02  -0.1723 -2.96  0.0293 4.45 
% Illiterate  -0.1262  -1.97  -0.0119  -0.75  -0.2717 -1.69  -0.0671 -3.70 
Growth retail 
sales per cap., 
1929-33 -8.2329  -7.40  -0.8642  -3.15  -1.5523 -0.56  -0.3316 -1.05 
Unemployment 
rate  0.6167  4.44  0.1012  2.95  3.1618 9.09  0.1507 3.84 
% Farm failures  0.1031  1.74  -0.0140  -0.96  0.1233 0.83  0.0150 0.89 
Average farm Size  0.0196  4.84  0.0046  4.57  -0.0100 -0.99  0.0006 0.56 
Mean Demo. % 
for Pres, 1896-
1928 0.0040  0.15  -0.0031  -0.49  0.0036 0.05  0.0039 0.53 
Roosevelt Swing  0.1823  4.51  0.0205  2.05  0.3074 3.04  0.0046 0.41 
Std. Dev. Demo. 
% for Pres. 1896-
1932  -0.1451  -1.67  -0.0379  -1.77  -0.6980 -3.21  -0.0285 -1.16 
Pres. Votes 
1932/population 
1930 0.0370  0.76  0.0717  5.95  -0.0557 -0.46  0.1230 8.90 
Avg. Tenure in 
House  0.0035  0.84  -0.0002  -0.21  -0.0045 -0.43  0.0012 1.00 
Congressional 
Committees                
Agriculture -0.7091  -0.78  -0.5266  -2.35  0.0316 0.01  -0.3410 -1.33 
Appropriations -2.4323  -2.59  -0.8100  -3.49  0.7042 0.30  0.1373 0.52 
Banking and 
Currency -1.6283  -1.42  -0.1719  -0.61  -8.0389 -2.79  -0.1342 -0.41   46
Exports -1.2407  -0.99  -0.3270  -1.06  -1.8414 -0.59  -0.2912 -0.82 
Flood Control  -0.8263  -0.71  -0.0327  -0.11  -1.8954 -0.65  0.5766 1.76 
Irrigation Control  -1.9970  -1.86  -1.0767  -4.06  -2.9604 -1.10  0.0346 0.11 
Labor 3.4260  2.75  0.5478  1.78  3.1127 1.00  0.1506 0.43 
Public Buildings  -2.5463  -2.03  -0.2250  -0.73  -1.2583 -0.40  0.1251 0.35 
Public Lands  1.9164  1.86  0.3053  1.20  -1.1271 -0.44  0.2375 0.81 
Rivers and 
Harbors 0.9491  0.91  -0.0919  -0.36  0.2533 0.10  -0.1089 -0.37 
Roads 1.6519  1.57  -0.2937  -1.13  5.1519 1.96  0.8301 2.80 
Ways and Means  0.3237  0.28  0.1803  0.64  1.3886 0.48  -0.0355 -0.11 
State Dummies                 
ME 0.4662  0.09  -0.5944  -0.48  1.8339 0.15  -1.4692 -1.03 
MA 7.8608  1.53  0.4572  0.36  29.5264 2.30  5.6351 3.88 
NH -4.2652  -0.78  0.4869  0.36  -9.5239 -0.69  -2.9745 -1.92 
RI -7.5885  -1.17  -1.4472  -0.90  -4.7561 -0.29  -2.8955 -1.57 
VT -1.7300  -0.34  0.6952  0.55  -3.1342 -0.24  -1.8019 -1.25 
DE 5.8826  0.74  -1.4975  -0.76  12.9152 0.65  -1.8049 -0.80 
NJ 4.8594  1.02  0.9806  0.83  15.8763 1.33  -2.4588 -1.82 
NY 0.8308  0.18  0.7113  0.63  -0.6754 -0.06  -1.7658 -1.37 
PA 12.5036  2.90  0.6544  0.61  33.9527 3.14  -1.2539 -1.03 
IL 1.7303  0.38  1.1909  1.06  21.1993 1.87  -1.2518 -0.98 
IN -0.3541  -0.08  2.0244  1.89  23.5719 2.16  -2.8241 -2.30 
MI 11.3893  2.64  7.1026  6.67  21.4098 1.98  -0.3199 -0.26 
OH 10.0859  2.25  3.4655  3.13  28.5320 2.54  3.1833 2.51 
WI 8.8932  2.02  5.9446  5.48  18.1522 1.65  1.7176 1.38 
IA -1.5531  -0.36  1.3456  1.26  4.0715 0.38  -0.5531 -0.45 
KS 8.2819  1.90  2.3421  2.18  21.6482 1.99  -3.6972 -3.01 
MN 6.6973  1.23  2.3331  1.74  16.8066 1.24  3.3958 2.21 
MO -0.6065  -0.12  1.1842  0.92  15.6639 1.20  -2.1275 -1.44 
NE -1.0501  -0.24  0.0767  0.07  15.8358 1.43  1.2085 0.97 
NDK 17.0072  3.52  3.8932  3.27  32.9788 2.73  -3.0946 -2.27 
SD 31.1441  6.89  7.6785  6.89  47.7913 4.22  -1.6064 -1.26 
VA 3.3491  0.70  4.7236  4.02  -3.8780 -0.33  -3.4625 -2.57 
AL 3.4697  0.76  4.1329  3.65  -3.3894 -0.30  -3.0288 -2.34 
AR 3.9310  0.87  3.9603  3.56  -0.2717 -0.02  -3.0216 -2.37 
FL 17.4146  3.88  4.9829  4.50  -3.6165 -0.32  -0.1041 -0.08 
GA 0.6073  0.14  2.3184  2.11  -5.2920 -0.48  -3.1631 -2.52 
LA 4.6846  1.02  2.3609  2.09  -7.4363 -0.65  -1.7824 -1.38 
MS 2.8654  0.62  2.2431  1.96  4.1759 0.36  -3.6074 -2.76 
NC 0.9038  0.21  1.1237  1.05  -5.8848 -0.54  -4.8338 -3.95 
SC 13.7815  2.88  4.7020  3.99  8.8730 0.74  -2.6041 -1.93 
TX 2.8768  0.63  3.9456  3.53  6.3028 0.56  1.1693 0.91 
KY 8.6120  1.75  1.9306  1.59  15.8042 1.28  -4.8428 -3.49   47
MD 3.8403  0.81  0.4651  0.40  6.2391 0.53  -1.1907 -0.89 
OK 3.6756  0.84  4.3510  4.01  16.4334 1.49  2.6256 2.11 
TN 2.0954  0.48  2.5809  2.38  -4.6257 -0.42  -2.6126 -2.11 
WV 15.3645  3.50  3.7234  3.43  27.7103 2.52  -4.0161 -3.23 
AZ 7.1935  1.38  6.5172  5.08  7.9045 0.61  0.9557 0.65 
CO 12.9721  2.90  0.4248  0.38  26.2968 2.34  10.0091 7.91 
ID 7.6465  1.67  6.7913  6.01  8.7717 0.76  4.0978 3.16 
MT 8.6388  1.90  5.0165  4.47  43.6240 3.83  1.7503 1.36 
NV 5.3659  0.99  7.1910  5.40  20.7122 1.53  0.7694 0.50 
NM 14.9452  3.12  1.2481  1.06  30.5011 2.54  -3.9201 -2.90 
UT 10.3338  2.17  2.0374  1.74  12.6562 1.06  4.3158 3.21 
WY 3.7870  0.77  3.6870  3.02  31.2655 2.52  0.3741 0.27 
CA -3.0902  -0.70  0.4001  0.37  9.7518 0.89  10.5580 8.49 
OR -10.778  -2.34  0.0545  0.05  -5.6534 -0.49  -0.9539 -0.73 
WA -6.6712  -1.47  3.7617  3.35  10.1620 0.89  5.5591 4.32 
R-squared 0.4132    0.4830    0.3137   0.6140  
R-bar-squared 0.3982    0.4699    0.2962   0.6041  
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Appendix Table 2 
 










Federal Loans  PRA Grants  PBA Grants 
  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff. 
t-
stat.  Coeff. 
t-
stat.  Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat. 
Intercept -90.5670  -2.72 4.4346 0.52 -15.0645  -1.03 -10.6473  -0.86  -0.4296 -0.45 
Inverse 
Population -0.9121  -6.19 -0.0046 -0.12 -0.0337  -0.52 1.0099  18.35  -0.0131 -3.08 
Square miles per 
capita 66.6841  7.62 -0.8623 -0.38 1.7895  0.47 65.4926  20.05  0.2259 0.89 
% Urban  0.0284  0.27 0.0303 1.12 0.0152  0.33 -0.0384  -0.98  -0.0003 -0.09 
% Land on Farms  -0.0353  -0.42 -0.0013 -0.06 -0.0326  -0.89 -0.0281  -0.90  -0.0093 -3.86 
Tax returns per 
capita -3.8093  -1.67 -0.3926 -0.67 -1.4086  -1.40 -0.4993  -0.59  0.0125 0.19 
Retail Sales per 
capita, 1929  0.0132  1.08 0.0133 4.24 0.0131  2.44 0.0124  2.73  0.0020 5.52 
% Black  0.3347  2.12 -0.0584 -1.44 -0.1905  -2.74 0.1399  2.37  -0.0099 -2.17 
% Illiterate  -0.3654  -0.84 0.1543 1.38 0.4230  2.21 0.1598  0.98  0.0092 0.73 
Growth retail 
sales per cap., 
1929-33 17.4998  2.31 2.0085 1.03 -3.3792  -1.02 6.8904  2.44  0.6946 3.18 
Unemployment 
rate 2.0795  2.20 -0.3795 -1.56 -0.2068  -0.50 -0.2390  -0.68  -0.0512 -1.88 
% Farm failures  -0.3252  -0.81 -0.0287 -0.28 -0.1737  -0.98 -0.4798  -3.19  0.0093 0.80 
Average farm Size  -0.0382  -1.39 -0.0173 -2.45 -0.0126  -1.05 -0.0572  -5.57  -0.0006 -0.70 
Mean Demo. % 
for Pres, 1896-
1928 0.1199  0.67 0.0386 0.84 0.1089  1.39 0.0511  0.77  0.0156 3.04 
Roosevelt Swing  0.4439  1.61 -0.1349 -1.91 -0.0675  -0.56 0.2680  2.61  0.0000 0.00 
Std. Dev. Demo. 
% for Pres. 1896-
1932  1.7989  3.05 0.2036 1.34 0.0524  0.20 -0.3891  -1.77  -0.0087 -0.51 
Pres. Votes 
1932/population 
1930 2.2289  6.71 0.1182 1.38 0.1054  0.72 0.5560  4.48  0.0033 0.34 
Avg. Tenure in 
House 0.0031  0.11 -0.0100 -1.38 -0.0152  -1.23 0.0016  0.15  -0.0004 -0.53 
Congressional 
Committees                    
Agriculture 6.0724  0.98 -0.4337 -0.27 -1.8793  -0.69 1.1597  0.50  -0.1324 -0.74 
Appropriations 0.7482  0.12 2.5267 1.54 6.8569  2.44 -2.7494  -1.15  0.1065 0.58 
Banking and 
Currency  1.5660  0.20 3.7736 1.88 4.5172  1.31 -1.4044  -0.48  -0.1122 -0.50   49
Exports 5.9626  0.70 -0.4468 -0.20 -0.4366  -0.12 -0.0128  0.00  -0.0715 -0.29 
Flood Control  -3.9228  -0.50 -0.3611 -0.18 1.4713  0.42 -1.3246  -0.45  -0.1509 -0.66 
Irrigation Control  3.0791  0.42 -2.7322 -1.46 0.0264  0.01 -8.4374  -3.10  -0.2351 -1.12 
Labor 2.8185  0.33 0.9910 0.45 0.6493  0.17 -1.8257  -0.58  -0.0399 -0.16 
Public Buildings  4.8151  0.56 -1.5997 -0.73 -0.8184  -0.22 3.4642  1.09  0.1167 0.47 
Public Lands  -3.4761  -0.49 -0.9636 -0.53 -3.2813  -1.06 7.4955  2.86  0.0229 0.11 
Rivers and 
Harbors -0.0761  -0.01 0.0310 0.02 -1.2165  -0.39 -0.0035  0.00  -0.2096 -1.03 
Roads 1.6573  0.23 -0.4964 -0.27 0.8899  0.28 -3.5658  -1.34  -0.1328 -0.64 
Ways and Means  -2.3899  -0.31 -1.6625 -0.83 0.3717  0.11 0.2221  0.08  0.4806 2.13 
State Dummies                     
ME 4.6051  0.13 -15.766 -1.80 1.2129  0.08 6.0623  0.48  0.3689 0.37 
MA 0.3617  0.01 -12.348 -1.37 0.1245  0.01 -4.9920  -0.38  -0.4300 -0.43 
NH -32.9910  -0.88 -8.6626 -0.90 2.6397  0.16 -1.9467  -0.14  0.7641 0.71 
RI 10.9573  0.25 8.3592 0.73 5.5676  0.29 9.4557  0.57  0.0382 0.03 
VT -12.3589  -0.36 -3.8358 -0.43 5.9399  0.39 4.5303  0.35  1.0884 1.08 
DE -34.5998  -0.64 -0.3723 -0.03 5.8397  0.25 7.3278  0.36  2.1389 1.37 
NJ -19.2639  -0.59 -8.5585 -1.03 6.8873  0.48 -7.5083  -0.62  0.2341 0.25 
NY -30.9292  -1.00 -6.2640 -0.79 3.9670  0.29 8.7147  0.75  1.1504 1.29 
PA -0.1230  0.00 -5.1549 -0.68 5.4584  0.42 6.8054  0.62  0.6472 0.76 
IL -35.3619  -1.15 -6.9255 -0.87 5.2303  0.39 2.1909  0.19  1.2782 1.43 
IN -37.3404  -1.26 -6.5546 -0.86 3.1908  0.25 -7.9712  -0.72  0.9938 1.16 
MI -30.0970  -1.03 -6.1794 -0.82 3.7356  0.29 5.9843  0.55  1.0527 1.24 
OH -35.0495  -1.15 -5.2631 -0.67 5.5890  0.42 -5.1630  -0.45  0.9256 1.05 
WI -28.8080  -0.96 -5.1633 -0.67 5.8367  0.44 -0.7821  -0.07  0.8407 0.97 
IA -26.8661  -0.91 -6.9747 -0.92 4.5445  0.35 1.8505  0.17  0.9477 1.11 
KS -21.8094  -0.74 -7.5591 -0.99 4.9534  0.38 9.1375  0.83  0.7651 0.90 
MN -36.7470  -1.00 0.2640 0.03 6.2271  0.38 4.6987  0.34  0.7990 0.75 
MO -16.8863  -0.48 -12.837 -1.41 -7.8290  -0.50 7.4919  0.57  0.6517 0.64 
NE -26.8770  -0.90 -1.1679 -0.15 16.7475  1.27 1.9703  0.18  0.8767 1.01 
NDK -22.8605  -0.70 -3.1896 -0.38 8.0879  0.56 16.2833  1.33  1.0419 1.10 
SD -18.3767  -0.60 -6.3733 -0.81 10.4314  0.77 7.3907  0.64  1.1304 1.27 
VA 43.0782  1.33 -5.1571 -0.62 6.6429  0.47 6.2403  0.52  1.0548 1.13 
AL 31.2983  1.00 -3.7090 -0.46 10.0604  0.73 10.6479  0.92  0.9813 1.09 
AR 29.0853  0.95 -3.6287 -0.46 12.9986  0.97 7.3761  0.65  0.8602 0.97 
FL 6.5421  0.21 -1.7974 -0.23 17.2550  1.29 -4.0232  -0.35  0.5599 0.64 
GA 31.8355  1.05 -4.1178 -0.53 10.9230  0.82 3.0794  0.27  0.9357 1.07 
LA 31.7603  1.02 -1.8067 -0.23 5.5990  0.41 6.9149  0.59  0.6288 0.70 
MS 51.8874  1.65 -5.4315 -0.67 6.3544  0.46 10.4059  0.89  1.0775 1.19 
NC 9.6745  0.33 -4.8497 -0.64 9.0361  0.70 0.7594  0.07  1.1497 1.35 
SC 51.2485  1.58 0.3477 0.04 16.5805  1.16 7.4269  0.61  0.4837 0.52 
TX 12.1384  0.39 -1.5998 -0.20 17.6660  1.30 9.6155  0.84  0.8677 0.98 
KY -9.8599  -0.30 -12.239 -1.42 -5.0251  -0.34 -2.8578  -0.23  0.5420 0.56   50
MD 19.5112  0.61 -1.0753 -0.13 8.3023  0.59 -5.0129  -0.42  2.4482 2.64 
OK -10.1685  -0.34 -0.2063 -0.03 15.8630  1.21 6.9812  0.63  0.8626 1.00 
TN 39.4553  1.32 -4.9806 -0.65 9.6551  0.74 3.1108  0.28  1.0807 1.25 
WV -17.5854  -0.59 -9.4866 -1.23 5.3585  0.41 -9.6816  -0.87  0.8776 1.02 
AZ 275.4149  7.79 -7.1117 -0.78 5.0519  0.33 42.0813  3.19  0.1886 0.18 
CO -42.6053  -1.40 -8.1495 -1.04 3.3421  0.25 16.9614  1.49  0.3867 0.44 
ID -47.0487  -1.51 -6.6069 -0.82 6.7779  0.49 -0.3550  -0.03  1.1886 1.32 
MT -25.9795  -0.84 7.5954 0.96 24.0003  1.77 26.1363  2.26  1.3238 1.48 
NV 46.4145  1.27 4.8942 0.52 4.3855  0.27 141.0288  10.30  1.3199 1.25 
NM -5.1964  -0.16 -0.7534 -0.09 8.9626  0.63 33.5038  2.76  0.8024 0.85 
UT -32.7021  -1.01 1.3658 0.16 10.2887  0.72 19.5715  1.62  0.3474 0.37 
WY -59.0923  -1.76 -4.2214 -0.49 8.0795  0.55 41.6576  3.32  1.2519 1.29 
CA -15.3471  -0.51 -4.9913 -0.65 5.4106  0.41 14.0747  1.26  0.2181 0.25 
OR -18.4752  -0.59 -1.1970 -0.15 8.4506  0.61 2.2006  0.19  1.3085 1.45 
WA -16.3501  -0.53 4.1316 0.52 5.4214  0.40 10.6247  0.92  0.9297 1.04 
R-squared 0.1316    0.5710   0.3050    0.6113    0.6790  
R-bar-squared 0.1095    0.3310   0.5800    0.6014    0.4410  
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Appendix Table 3 
 
OLS Regression Results for Farm Programs 
 
  AAA Grants  FCA Loans  FSA Grants  FSA Loans  REA Loans 
  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat. 
Intercept -13.7358 -0.90  -0.3825 -0.04  5.3538  2.58  9.2977 3.03  -5.3719  -2.11 
Inverse 
Population 0.2707 3.99  0.1653 4.13  0.0064  0.70  0.0046 0.34  -0.0121  -1.07 
Square miles per 
capita  -21.0818 -5.24  7.2006 3.03  -0.0039  -0.01  0.2034 0.25  -1.0891  -1.62 
% Urban  -0.3980 -8.24  -0.2452 -8.60  0.0123  1.87  -0.0181 -1.87  -0.0540  -6.71 
% Land on Farms  -0.0757 -1.98  0.0726 3.22  -0.0137  -2.64  -0.0084 -1.10  0.0276  4.33 
Tax returns per 
capita 1.7000 1.62  0.7055 1.14  -0.4570  -3.21  -1.5597 -7.41  -0.0435  -0.25 
Retail Sales per 
capita, 1929  0.0155 2.76  0.0045 1.36  -0.0041  -5.33  -0.0025 -2.19  0.0003  0.36 
% Black  0.0661 0.91  -0.0340 -0.79  -0.0010  -0.10  0.0264 1.81  -0.0024  -0.20 
% Illiterate  -0.2014 -1.00  -0.5493 -4.64  -0.0355  -1.30  -0.1614 -4.01  -0.0190  -0.57 
Growth retail 
sales per cap., 
1929-33 -10.7206 -3.08  -8.4344 -4.11  -2.2345  -4.73  -3.5266 -5.05  1.7717  3.06 
Unemployment 
rate  -2.0329 -4.68  -1.0571 -4.13  -0.0756  -1.28  -0.3988 -4.58  -0.0099  -0.14 
% Farm failures  -0.5335 -2.88  -0.2206 -2.02  0.0500  1.98  0.0729 1.96  -0.0346  -1.12 
Average farm Size  0.6336 50.13  0.2176 29.18  0.0116  6.76  0.0281 11.07  -0.0029  -1.38 
Mean Demo. % 
for Pres, 1896-
1928 0.2294 2.81  -0.0051 -0.11  0.0004  0.03  0.0152 0.93  0.0770  5.66 
Roosevelt Swing  0.6214 4.92  0.0661 0.89  0.0517  3.01  0.0050 0.20  0.0995  4.72 
Std. Dev. Demo. 
% for Pres. 1896-
1932  -0.3139 -1.16  0.5254 3.28  0.0649  1.76  0.0575 1.05  -0.0525  -1.16 
Pres. Votes 
1932/population 
1930 0.1315 0.86  0.1645 1.82  -0.0383  -1.85  0.0329 1.07  0.1187  4.66 
Avg. Tenure in 
House  0.0392 3.03  0.0087 1.14  -0.0001  -0.04  -0.0060 -2.29  0.0028  1.28 
Congressional 
Committees                    
Agriculture 20.3306 7.17  6.4896 3.88  -0.4200  -1.09  -0.0096 -0.02  1.2280  2.60 
Appropriations -9.9392 -3.38  -1.6625 -0.96  -0.2599  -0.65  -0.5457 -0.92  -0.9172  -1.87 
Banking and 
Currency  -0.9138 -0.25  1.9820 0.93  -0.2197  -0.45  0.5993 0.83  0.6461  1.08 
Exports -2.8680 -0.73  1.7876 0.77  -0.0735  -0.14  -0.0606 -0.08  0.3768  0.58 
Flood Control  2.7696 0.76  -0.3325 -0.16  -0.2985  -0.61  -1.6012 -2.20  0.0509  0.08 
Irrigation Control  -7.5366 -2.24  -1.3248 -0.67  0.8643  1.90  0.3980 0.59  -0.0131  -0.02   52
Labor 31.0280 7.96  4.0449 1.76  -0.3128  -0.59  0.8296 1.06  -0.6424  -0.99 
Public Buildings  8.0341 2.05  1.4440 0.62  0.0870  0.16  0.9054 1.15  -0.6488  -0.99 
Public Lands  3.4877 1.08  -1.2547 -0.66  0.4855  1.11  -0.5333 -0.82  0.4966  0.92 
Rivers and 
Harbors -2.3336 -0.72  -2.6514 -1.38  -0.2782  -0.63  0.1111 0.17  0.1860  0.34 
Roads -0.1668 -0.05  3.1469 1.63  -0.2806  -0.63  -0.4089 -0.62  0.0291  0.05 
Ways and Means  2.2013 0.61  -0.3755 -0.18  0.1345  0.28  0.7493 1.04  0.3755  0.63 
State Dummies                     
ME -18.5647 -1.18  -13.5307 -1.46  -1.5598  -0.73  -1.7811 -0.57  -1.3641  -0.52 
MA -6.3404 -0.39  -3.4611 -0.37  0.1032  0.05  1.2147 0.38  1.1334  0.42 
NH -22.5855 -1.32  -11.3027 -1.12  -0.2387  -0.10  -0.3387 -0.10  -1.9627  -0.69 
RI 7.5111 0.37  2.8550 0.24  -1.3278  -0.48  -0.4992 -0.12  0.7399  0.22 
VT -32.9341 -2.06  -19.6199 -2.08  -1.5692  -0.72  -2.4033 -0.75  -1.6319  -0.61 
DE -33.4715 -1.35  -20.3997 -1.39  -0.1343  -0.04  -5.4579 -1.09  4.4841  1.08 
NJ -14.9785 -1.00  -4.4538 -0.51  -0.3247  -0.16  -1.1059 -0.37  0.1447  0.06 
NY -55.4797 -3.90  -18.2843 -2.18  0.4242  0.22  -3.2061 -1.12  -0.5912  -0.25 
PA -19.0678 -1.41  -13.7481 -1.73  -2.4087  -1.32  -4.6436 -1.72  2.2206  0.99 
IL -58.0380 -4.09  -21.0055 -2.51  -2.1615  -1.12  -6.8141 -2.39  2.5374  1.07 
IN -14.5450 -1.07  -12.7449 -1.59  -2.1953  -1.19  -5.7271 -2.10  2.6264  1.16 
MI -23.2810 -1.73  -9.9551 -1.25  -2.8453  -1.55  -4.1023 -1.51  4.2735  1.90 
OH -19.0853 -1.36  -15.0477 -1.82  -1.5980  -0.84  -5.3484 -1.90  2.1804  0.93 
WI -36.5363 -2.66  -2.2721 -0.28  -1.2839  -0.69  -3.2345 -1.17  3.1679  1.38 
IA -1.5422 -0.11  -9.8338 -1.23  -3.2498  -1.77  -5.5893 -2.06  4.1456  1.84 
KS 17.2793 1.27  -4.2028 -0.52  1.8475  1.00  -0.8471 -0.31  -0.4448  -0.20 
MN -112.1009 -6.60  -15.1175 -1.51  -1.7206  -0.75  -3.2537 -0.95  2.3272  0.82 
MO -30.2350 -1.86  -17.8704 -1.86  0.6145  0.28  -2.9463 -0.90  0.5762  0.21 
NE -33.3224 -2.42  -10.7541 -1.32  1.8089  0.97  -0.3190 -0.12  3.5221  1.53 
NDK -73.1425 -4.85  39.2487 4.41  25.6946  12.54  -1.0714 -0.35  -1.7920  -0.71 
SD -50.7771 -3.59  17.4094 2.09  28.1018  14.65  6.7433 2.38  -3.3049  -1.40 
VA -24.6360 -1.65  -12.5404 -1.43  -3.4328  -1.70  -5.6179 -1.88  1.5122  0.61 
AL -8.4834 -0.59  -6.6644 -0.79  -5.2825  -2.71  -1.2245 -0.43  0.4691  0.20 
AR -12.6502 -0.90  -8.2145 -0.99  -5.4105  -2.83  -0.7798 -0.28  0.4737  0.20 
FL -18.4285 -1.31  -0.0596 -0.01  -4.5856  -2.41  -2.1489 -0.76  1.2435  0.53 
GA -17.6524 -1.27  -2.4901 -0.30  -5.6144  -2.97  -3.1661 -1.13  2.7257  1.18 
LA -2.7256 -0.19  0.3426 0.04  -4.8011  -2.47  0.1205 0.04  -0.1536  -0.06 
MS -14.3888 -0.99  -3.6128 -0.42  -4.8653  -2.48  -2.0895 -0.72  1.5842  0.66 
NC -7.1400 -0.53  -2.1829 -0.27  -4.2322  -2.30  -6.0583 -2.23  -0.7778  -0.34 
SC -5.9435 -0.40  15.1025 1.71  -3.4777  -1.71  -1.7728 -0.59  -0.5000  -0.20 
TX 2.8795 0.20  4.4105 0.53  -4.4069  -2.29  -2.0411 -0.72  1.0424  0.44 
KY -7.1825 -0.47  -15.4250 -1.70  -1.4875  -0.71  -7.5006 -2.43  -0.9176  -0.36 
MD -27.3470 -1.85  -12.2973 -1.41  -2.2940  -1.14  -6.3290 -2.14  -2.2758  -0.92 
OK -5.0639 -0.37  -17.8716 -2.21  -2.5609  -1.37  -1.1138 -0.40  -0.6865  -0.30 
TN -11.6153 -0.85  -6.2708 -0.77  -4.6146  -2.48  -6.9970 -2.54  2.7918  1.22   53
WV -22.0385 -1.60  -12.8288 -1.58  -2.2051  -1.18  -5.8947 -2.14  -3.2237  -1.41 
AZ -11.9143 -0.73  -11.8308 -1.23  -3.3045  -1.50  -1.4585 -0.45  2.6213  0.97 
CO -51.7813 -3.70  -20.3937 -2.47  -1.3273  -0.70  7.5321 2.68  2.7133  1.16 
ID -17.4534 -1.22  -10.6750 -1.26  -4.0212  -2.07  4.7883 1.67  1.7035  0.71 
MT -51.6625 -3.63  -13.2835 -1.58  4.8039  2.49  6.7864 2.38  1.2075  0.51 
NV -66.9753 -3.97  -51.6280 -5.19  -3.6424  -1.59  0.7543 0.22  1.1975  0.43 
NM -1.9666 -0.13  3.3400 0.38  -4.1946  -2.06  1.2661 0.42  -0.9891  -0.40 
UT -11.5194 -0.78  -4.3202 -0.49  -3.0040  -1.49  11.7366 3.94  3.6254  1.46 
WY -85.7267 -5.54  1.1017 0.12  2.1995  1.05  29.6679 9.56  3.9249  1.52 
CA -43.6836 -3.18  -3.2094 -0.40  -1.5408  -0.83  0.4687 0.17  -0.8971  -0.39 
OR -48.3945 -3.36  -24.3369 -2.86  -3.6471  -1.86  -2.4008 -0.83  0.4748  0.20 
WA -42.7250 -3.00  -30.7315 -3.66  -3.8264  -1.98  -1.3582 -0.48  2.8439  1.20 
R-squared 0.7466   0.6934   0.6831    0.4747   0.1923   
R-bar-squared 0.7402   0.6856   0.6751    0.4613   0.1717   
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Appendix Table 4 
 
OLS Regression Results for Loan and Housing Programs 
 
  RFC Loans  HOLC Loans 
FHA Loans 
Insured  USHA Loans  USHA Grants 
  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff. 
t-
stat. 
Intercept -24.9665  -1.81  -4.4768  -1.31 -8.5017  -1.38  0.2743  0.20  -0.6112  -1.37
Inverse 
Population 0.0635  1.04  -0.0061  -0.40 0.0526  1.93  0.0053  0.87  0.0018  0.91
Square miles per 
capita -7.7720  -2.14  -2.8769  -3.20 -6.6808  -4.13  0.1850  0.52  0.0776  0.66
% Urban  0.1590  3.65  0.1722  15.94 0.1101  5.67  0.0358  8.31  0.0037  2.61
% Land on Farms  -0.1081  -3.14  -0.0256  -2.99 -0.0243  -1.58  -0.0153  -4.48  -0.0014  -1.25
Tax returns per 
capita 2.0112  2.13  3.8808  16.55 3.7223  8.83  0.3485  3.73  0.1102  3.59
Retail Sales per 
capita, 1929  0.0228  4.50  0.0043  3.43 0.0050  2.20  0.0011  2.18  0.0004  2.44
% Black  -0.0502  -0.77  -0.0190  -1.17 0.0228  0.78  0.0005  0.08  0.0049  2.30
% Illiterate  0.2932  1.62  -0.0494  -1.10 -0.1287  -1.60  -0.0488  -2.73  -0.0116  -1.98
Growth retail 
sales per cap., 
1929-33 0.2973  0.09  -1.2170  -1.57 3.8190  2.73  0.4247  1.37  0.0705  0.69
Unemployment 
rate -0.2326  -0.59  0.1618  1.67 -0.1035  -0.59  0.0202  0.52  -0.0014  -0.11
% Farm failures  0.0761  0.45  -0.0472  -1.14 -0.0583  -0.78  0.0169  1.02  0.0026  0.48
Average farm Size  0.0111  0.97  0.0029  1.02 -0.0223  -4.38  -0.0006  -0.55  -0.0005  -1.40
Mean Demo. % 
for Pres, 1896-
1928 -0.0358  -0.49  -0.0358  -1.96 -0.0405  -1.23  0.0008  0.12  -0.0001  -0.05
Roosevelt Swing  -0.0934  -0.82  -0.0235  -0.83 -0.0526  -1.03  0.0039  0.34  0.0038  1.03
Std. Dev. Demo. 
% for Pres. 1896-
1932 0.2884  1.18  -0.0596  -0.98 0.1168  1.07  0.0233  0.96  0.0040  0.50
Pres. Votes 
1932/population 
1930 0.1123  0.82  -0.1017  -2.98 0.0908  1.48  -0.0253  -1.86  -0.0023  -0.51
Avg. Tenure in 
House 0.0013  0.11  -0.0020  -0.71 -0.0104  -1.99  0.0001  0.08  0.0001  0.35
Congressional 
Committees                    
Agriculture -0.3161  -0.12  1.1259  1.78 0.8019  0.70  0.0036  0.01  0.0277  0.33
Appropriations 5.0264  1.90  0.5653  0.86 -0.3006  -0.25  -0.1014  -0.39  0.0799  0.93
Banking and 
Currency 2.6330  0.81  -1.5972  -1.99 -1.7824  -1.23  0.1074  0.33  0.1318  1.25
Exports -2.6420  -0.75  -0.7310  -0.83 -3.1821  -2.02  -0.5043  -1.44  -0.1148  -1.00
Flood Control  -5.4848  -1.68  1.8072  2.23 3.7556  2.58  0.0803  0.25  0.1991  1.87  55
Irrigation Control  -4.4054  -1.46  -0.4445  -0.59 -0.5737  -0.43  0.1061  0.35  0.0463  0.47
Labor 4.7455  1.35  -0.6395  -0.73 -1.2436  -0.79  1.1119  3.20  0.3448  3.02
Public Buildings  -1.1071  -0.31  -2.0852  -2.38 -0.7025  -0.45  0.4002  1.14  0.0878  0.76
Public Lands  -6.0680  -2.08  1.4134  1.96 -2.4608  -1.90  0.1235  0.43  0.0234  0.25
Rivers and 
Harbors 0.6666  0.23  0.3557  0.49 -0.4864  -0.37  0.0608  0.21  0.2346  2.46
Roads 11.3827  3.85  1.4259  1.94 1.1633  0.88  -0.2710  -0.93  -0.0002  0.00
Ways and Means  0.1363  0.04  -1.2339  -1.54 -0.3369  -0.23  0.0809  0.25  0.2377  2.26
State Dummies                     
ME 46.6492  3.29  3.4153  0.97 1.9139  0.30  -1.5669  -1.12  0.0699  0.15
MA -9.5206  -0.66  -3.6886  -1.03 -6.8312  -1.06  -0.7678  -0.54  0.0178  0.04
NH 5.3194  0.34  -5.5638  -1.45 -0.2733  -0.04  -2.3670  -1.55  -0.1861  -0.37
RI -7.2312  -0.39  8.3303  1.83 6.2033  0.76  -3.4667  -1.91  -0.2150  -0.36
VT 65.4724  4.54  5.4113  1.52 7.8467  1.22  -0.1891  -0.13  0.1098  0.23
DE 9.7187  0.43  10.0632  1.81 13.8298  1.38  -0.7569  -0.34  0.0696  0.10
NJ 29.2933  2.18  14.0724  4.22 23.0547  3.84  0.3336  0.25  0.7593  1.74
NY 16.2290  1.27  5.1669  1.63 7.7636  1.36  -2.3577  -1.86  -0.1303  -0.31
PA 24.1905  1.99  1.8803  0.62 5.6039  1.03  -0.7890  -0.66  0.0840  0.21
IL 18.3023  1.43  9.1740  2.89 10.2261  1.79  -1.0900  -0.86  0.0687  0.17
IN 24.5439  2.00  16.7399  5.51 12.4240  2.27  0.5113  0.42  0.4291  1.08
MI 27.0302  2.22  10.2926  3.41 9.1638  1.69  -1.0425  -0.87  0.1037  0.26
OH 25.6486  2.03  17.1197  5.46 11.6092  2.06  0.2756  0.22  0.3561  0.87
WI 23.3371  1.88  13.3686  4.35 4.5127  0.82  -1.1757  -0.96  -0.0061  -0.02
IA 28.6972  2.35  9.3547  3.09 6.5368  1.20  -0.1010  -0.08  0.2066  0.52
KS 8.3547  0.68  11.0874  3.65 11.3420  2.07  -0.5136  -0.42  0.1094  0.27
MN 25.1133  1.64  6.8248  1.80 2.6328  0.39  -1.6330  -1.08  -0.7018  -1.41
MO 3.9852  0.27  10.5744  2.90 10.2982  1.57  -0.4430  -0.30  -0.7523  -1.58
NE 17.8534  1.44  14.1383  4.59 8.8778  1.60  0.4764  0.39  0.3855  0.96
NDK 24.1773  1.78  11.3928  3.38 18.1090  2.99  0.3770  0.28  0.2801  0.63
SD 32.0263  2.51  14.0203  4.44 13.6620  2.41  0.2147  0.17  0.3353  0.81
VA 24.4286  1.82  10.7943  3.24 21.8782  3.65  0.8464  0.64  0.3777  0.87
AL 22.5867  1.75  12.3661  3.86 17.3538  3.01  1.0626  0.83  0.5484  1.31
AR 33.9766  2.68  10.2084  3.24 14.8071  2.61  -0.2654  -0.21  0.2358  0.57
FL 20.8133  1.65  11.2823  3.60 20.8316  3.70  0.7498  0.60  0.1855  0.45
GA 27.6051  2.20  11.7613  3.78 15.6881  2.81  1.4859  1.20  0.3790  0.93
LA 42.1708  3.26  10.8618  3.39 15.7408  2.73  0.7380  0.58  0.2522  0.60
MS 33.4586  2.57  10.6937  3.31 18.9203  3.25  1.3231  1.03  0.2227  0.53
NC 23.2627  1.90  12.5916  4.16 13.6294  2.50  1.2388  1.03  0.3824  0.96
SC 27.8538  2.07  11.1794  3.35 17.9332  2.99  1.6342  1.23  0.8346  1.91
TX 24.2703  1.90  8.3144  2.63 18.1602  3.19  0.3334  0.26  0.2800  0.67
KY 8.9130  0.64  10.6759  3.11 11.3826  1.84  2.1669  1.58  0.3570  0.79
MD 38.4909  2.89  14.4764  4.38 23.0059  3.87  1.5322  1.16  0.1220  0.28
OK 14.4946  1.17  14.8974  4.85 13.7389  2.49  -0.1559  -0.13  0.4913  1.22  56
TN 35.1262  2.84  9.7461  3.18 15.2025  2.76  1.3435  1.10  0.8682  2.16
WV 26.2991  2.12  12.2785  4.00 8.1009  1.47  1.4508  1.18  0.3628  0.90
AZ 4.7638  0.32  12.4180  3.42 24.8876  3.81  -1.9103  -1.32  -0.0099  -0.02
CO 18.2915  1.45  9.5128  3.04 9.0020  1.60  -0.6653  -0.53  0.1378  0.34
ID 24.9472  1.93  12.1080  3.78 15.9237  2.77  -1.3156  -1.03  0.0856  0.20
MT 29.7904  2.32  6.7979  2.14 14.3526  2.51  -0.2668  -0.21  0.1194  0.29
NV 71.0754  4.67  7.3473  1.95 30.3546  4.48  -3.2084  -2.13  -0.5071  -1.03
NM 34.3300  2.54  9.2016  2.75 21.0328  3.49  -0.3273  -0.25  0.2992  0.68
UT 18.6770  1.39  20.4736  6.16 15.9506  2.67  -1.1767  -0.89  0.2057  0.47
WY 9.4666  0.68  13.5953  3.93 29.9867  4.82  -2.5657  -1.86  -0.3815  -0.84
CA 51.1405  4.12  -2.5918  -0.84 47.7099  8.63  -2.0575  -1.68  -0.3463  -0.86
OR 28.9480  2.23  2.4506  0.76 16.9384  2.92  -1.4424  -1.12  0.0239  0.06
WA 17.9019  1.40  1.2841  0.40 16.7896  2.93  -1.9774  -1.56  -0.2072  -0.50
R-squared 0.1713    0.5874    0.3771    0.1910    0.8830   
R-bar-squared 0.1502    0.5769    0.3612    0.1704    0.6500   
   57
 
Appendix Table 5 
 
OLS Regression Results for Aggregate Programs 
 
 




Works Grants  Total Loans 
  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat.  Coeff.  t-stat. Coeff.  t-stat.
Intercept -26.0720 -0.59  67.6995 4.44  -97.2093 -2.54  -40.0274 -1.71 
Inverse 
Population 0.3982 2.02  0.0242 0.36  0.0801 0.47  0.1877 1.81 
Square miles per 
capita 97.8550 8.35  -5.8692 -1.46  131.5403 13.05  -2.3770 -0.39 
% Urban  -0.0293 -0.21  0.2814 5.85  0.0200 0.17  0.0651 0.88 
% Land on Farms  -0.6467 -5.81  -0.5240 -13.77  -0.0738 -0.77  -0.0897 -1.53 
Tax returns per 
capita -6.4079 -2.10  -2.6932 -2.58  -4.6887 -1.78  3.9072 2.43 
Retail Sales per 
capita, 1929  0.0332 2.03  -0.0192 -3.44  0.0409 2.91  0.0436 5.07 
% Black  0.2651 1.25  -0.1523 -2.10  0.4063 2.23  -0.2653 -2.38 
% Illiterate  -0.7407 -1.27  -0.4768 -2.39  -0.0422 -0.08  -0.1132 -0.37 
Growth retail 
sales per cap., 
1929-33 0.4590 0.05  -10.981 -3.17  27.0932 3.11  -13.9475 -2.62 
Unemployment 
rate 3.1342 2.48  4.0304 9.32  1.4099 1.30  -1.6877 -2.54 
% Farm failures  -0.9820 -1.82  0.2274 1.23  -0.8245 -1.77  -0.3005 -1.06 
Average farm Size  0.5520 14.99  0.0148 1.17  -0.1133 -3.58  0.2433 12.57 
Mean Demo. % 
for Pres, 1896-
1928 0.4266 1.79  0.0083 0.10  0.2251 1.10  0.1278 1.02 
Roosevelt Swing  1.8031 4.90  0.5148 4.09  0.5771 1.82  -0.0053 -0.03 
Std. Dev. Demo. 
% for Pres. 1896-
1932 0.2069 0.26  -0.9095 -3.36  1.6046 2.36  0.8276 1.99 
Pres. Votes 
1932/population 
1930 2.7561 6.19  0.1760 1.16  2.9064 7.60  0.4055 1.73 
Avg. Tenure in 
House 0.0274 0.73  0.0000 0.00  -0.0058 -0.18  -0.0105 -0.53 
Congressional 
Committees                
Agriculture 23.7676 2.88  -1.5451 -0.55  6.6660 0.94  6.6952 1.54 
Appropriations -11.7471 -1.37  -2.4007 -0.82  0.6320 0.09  9.1898 2.04 
Banking and 
Currency -7.2145 -0.69  -9.9732 -2.78  3.8230 0.42  8.8585 1.61 
Exports -0.3763 -0.03  -3.7002 -0.95  5.4315 0.55  -2.2083 -0.37   58
Flood Control  -5.2001 -0.49  -2.1777 -0.60  -5.7594 -0.63  -4.1650 -0.75 
Irrigation Control  -20.8424 -2.13  -5.9996 -1.79  -8.3256 -0.99  -5.5611 -1.08 
Labor 39.3860 3.47  7.2371 1.86  1.9439 0.20  10.0680 1.69 
Public Buildings  10.0966 0.88  -3.9044 -1.00  6.7963 0.69  -1.6642 -0.28 
Public Lands  7.2117 0.77  1.3322 0.41  3.0787 0.38  -9.1307 -1.85 
Rivers and 
Harbors -1.1888 -0.13  1.0016 0.31  -0.2581 -0.03  -2.2874 -0.46 
Roads 2.8006 0.29  7.3402 2.24  -2.5377 -0.31  16.1604 3.21 
Ways and Means  0.4273 0.04  1.8571 0.52  -3.3497 -0.37  0.4093 0.07 
State Dummies                 
ME -20.5707 -0.45  0.2363 0.02  -4.7296 -0.12  32.3304 1.34 
MA 22.2427 0.48  43.4795 2.72  -17.4087 -0.43  -15.4975 -0.63 
NH -77.8722 -1.56  -16.277 -0.95  -42.8362 -1.00  -13.9653 -0.53 
RI 16.7490 0.28  -16.687 -0.82  28.8104 0.57  7.3421 0.24 
VT -50.6839 -1.09  -5.9710 -0.38  -10.5760 -0.26  52.3619 2.14 
DE -41.2803 -0.57  15.4953 0.62  -25.5054 -0.41  2.5051 0.07 
NJ -25.3494 -0.58  19.2575 1.29  -35.0967 -0.94  44.3516 1.94 
NY -81.7167 -1.97  -0.8992 -0.06  -27.3280 -0.77  0.2156 0.01 
PA 25.5150 0.65  45.8569 3.41  2.1748 0.06  13.8015 0.67 
IL -72.6048 -1.76  22.8686 1.62  -38.8183 -1.09  6.0047 0.28 
IN -40.7139 -1.03  22.4182 1.65  -50.8725 -1.49  28.7883 1.38 
MI -13.2196 -0.34  39.5818 2.94  -29.2394 -0.87  29.3689 1.42 
OH -15.7292 -0.39  45.2667 3.24  -44.5500 -1.27  29.5721 1.38 
WI -35.6180 -0.89  34.7075 2.54  -33.9127 -0.99  38.1824 1.81 
IA -31.5192 -0.80  3.3110 0.25  -31.0426 -0.92  30.5056 1.47 
KS 28.5344 0.72  28.5750 2.11  -19.4660 -0.57  17.7285 0.85 
MN -111.9644 -2.26  29.2329 1.73  -30.9852 -0.73  19.7579 0.76 
MO -34.3703 -0.72  14.1140 0.87  -21.5792 -0.53  -14.9334 -0.60 
NE -41.4022 -1.03  16.0709 1.17  -25.1979 -0.73  40.9651 1.94 
NDK -6.4276 -0.15  50.7846 3.38  -8.7249 -0.23  79.7698 3.45 
SD 45.7383 1.11  85.0076 6.04  -16.2289 -0.46  76.8703 3.55 
VA 12.3426 0.28  0.7322 0.05  45.2162 1.21  25.1659 1.10 
AL 19.7406 0.47  1.1845 0.08  39.2185 1.09  37.7223 1.72 
AR 12.8852 0.31  4.5980 0.33  33.6929 0.95  47.6301 2.21 
FL -4.6601 -0.11  18.6769 1.34  1.2815 0.04  48.0349 2.24 
GA -5.8773 -0.15  -5.5293 -0.40  31.7328 0.91  47.8728 2.25 
LA 20.0420 0.48  -2.1732 -0.15  37.4972 1.04  58.7408 2.68 
MS 35.2301 0.84  5.6770 0.39  57.9392 1.60  46.7574 2.11 
NC -15.3661 -0.39  -8.6911 -0.64  6.7339 0.20  36.1903 1.74 
SC 68.0705 1.56  24.7524 1.66  59.5069 1.59  69.0236 3.01 
TX 26.0486 0.63  14.2945 1.01  21.0218 0.59  53.0715 2.44 
KY -7.1586 -0.16  21.5040 1.40  -24.4144 -0.63  -7.7321 -0.33 
MD -6.0444 -0.14  9.3538 0.64  15.8712 0.43  41.0349 1.81   59
OK 15.2355 0.38  27.0856 1.98  -2.5310 -0.07  24.5374 1.17 
TN 13.8849 0.35  -2.5621 -0.19  38.6663 1.13  44.6854 2.13 
WV -13.2476 -0.33  42.7821 3.13  -35.8759 -1.04  22.7711 1.08 
AZ 312.5128 6.60  22.5708 1.39  310.5732 7.63  8.8344 0.35 
CO -40.7821 -1.00  49.7027 3.56  -33.4068 -0.95  19.5822 0.91 
ID -39.8185 -0.95  27.3073 1.91  -52.8220 -1.47  37.7895 1.72 
MT 18.3187 0.44  59.0296 4.17  9.0760 0.25  54.3343 2.49 
NV 162.4684 3.31  34.0386 2.03  193.6574 4.58  29.0344 1.12 
NM 64.5628 1.48  42.7743 2.87  28.3563 0.76  54.9862 2.40 
UT 1.9793 0.05  29.3431 1.98  -11.4175 -0.31  58.6017 2.57 
WY -64.3489 -1.43  39.1136 2.54  -20.4042 -0.53  62.5916 2.64 
CA -32.4316 -0.81  17.6197 1.29  -6.0456 -0.18  47.7188 2.26 
OR -82.4779 -1.96  -17.331 -1.21  -16.1631 -0.45  11.3864 0.52 
WA -31.0679 -0.75  12.8116 0.90  -0.6642 -0.02  -7.3958 -0.34 
R-squared 0.4405   0.4258   0.3010   0.3476  
R-bar-squared 0.4262   0.4112   0.2832   0.3310  
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Appendix Table 6 
 
Comparisons of Adjusted R-squareds from Regressions with Political Variables Only and Structural, Relief, 
Recovery, and Reform Variables Only for Each Program 
 
 















RELIEF:    
  FERA Grants  0.117 0.200 0.398 
  CWA Grants  0.146 0.232 0.470 
  WPA Grants  0.106 0.201 0.296 
  SSA Pub. Asst. Grants  0.327 0.258 0.604 
PUBLIC WORKS:    
 Federal PWA Grants  0.007 0.055 0.110 
 Nonfed. PWA Grants  0.008 0.028 0.331 
 Nonfed PWA Loans  0.003 0.005 0.580 
 PRA Grants  0.151 0.555 0.601 
 PBA Grants  0.007 0.040 0.441 
FARM PROGRAMS:    
  AAA Grants  0.175 0.665 0.740 
  FCA Loans  0.284 0.613 0.686 
  FSA Grants  0.272 0.282 0.675 
  FSA Loans  0.145 0.301 0.461 
  REA Loans  0.065 0.090 0.172 
LOANS AND HOUSING:   
  RFC Loans  0.019 0.105 0.150 
  HOLC Loans  0.080 0.505 0.577 
  FHA Loans Insured   0.034 0.259 0.361 
  USHA Loan Contracts  0.019 0.137 0.170 
  USHA Grants  0.004 0.047 0.650 
AGGREGATES:    
  Total Grants  0.206 0.367 0.426 
    Relief Grants  0.151 0.268 0.411 
    Public Works Grants  0.065 0.229 0.283 
  Total Loans  0.175 0.290 0.331 
 
 